Peer-Reviewed Publications
Move First to Avoid the Worst: Leadership Turnover and the Targeting of New Leaders
Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE. Appendix available HERE
International Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqad072
Are leaders more likely to face militarized challenges earlier in their tenure? Existing studies posit contradictory hypotheses: new leaders can both invite challengers to take advantage of their inexperience, and deter challengers by their strong incentive to establish a reputation for resolve. This paper seeks to reconcile these competing propositions by developing an argument that centers on the direction of foreign policy preference change associated with leadership turnover. I argue that foreign adversaries are likely to challenge a new leader in their rival state only when the newcomer is perceived to be more hawkish than the predecessor. The perception of a heightened risk of conflict accompanied with the emergence of a more hawkish leader in the rival state gives foreign adversaries stronger incentive to seek for an early confrontation in which they can (re)demonstrate their own position to the new hawk. In contrast, when the newcomer is perceived to be more dovish than the predecessor, optimistic expectations of future interactions tend to restrain foreign adversaries from provoking the new dove whose reputation concern is high. A series of statistical analyses on post-WWII dyadic-rivalries with democratically elected leaders on the target side yield strong evidence that supports this conditional hypothesis.
Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE. Appendix available HERE
International Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqad072
Are leaders more likely to face militarized challenges earlier in their tenure? Existing studies posit contradictory hypotheses: new leaders can both invite challengers to take advantage of their inexperience, and deter challengers by their strong incentive to establish a reputation for resolve. This paper seeks to reconcile these competing propositions by developing an argument that centers on the direction of foreign policy preference change associated with leadership turnover. I argue that foreign adversaries are likely to challenge a new leader in their rival state only when the newcomer is perceived to be more hawkish than the predecessor. The perception of a heightened risk of conflict accompanied with the emergence of a more hawkish leader in the rival state gives foreign adversaries stronger incentive to seek for an early confrontation in which they can (re)demonstrate their own position to the new hawk. In contrast, when the newcomer is perceived to be more dovish than the predecessor, optimistic expectations of future interactions tend to restrain foreign adversaries from provoking the new dove whose reputation concern is high. A series of statistical analyses on post-WWII dyadic-rivalries with democratically elected leaders on the target side yield strong evidence that supports this conditional hypothesis.
Domestic Polarization and Great Power Competition: How Adversaries Respond to America’s Partisan Politics
(with Rachel Myrick)
Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE. Appendix available HERE
Journal of Politics, Forthcoming. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/726926
How do foreign rivals perceive and respond to heightened domestic polarization in the United States? The conventional thinking is that polarization weakens and distracts the U.S., emboldening its adversaries. However, untested assumptions underlie this claim. We use two strategies to explore mechanisms linking domestic polarization and international rivalry. First, we field a survey experiment in China to examine how heightening perceptions of U.S. polarization affects public attitudes towards Chinese foreign policy. Second, we investigate how U.S. rival governments responded to an episode of extreme partisanship: the U.S. Capitol attacks on January 6, 2021. Drawing on ICEWS event data, we explore whether foreign rivals increased hostility towards the U.S. following the Capitol riots. Both studies fail to show robust evidence for the emboldening hypothesis. Extreme polarization has other negative consequences for American foreign policy, but we find no evidence that it makes adversaries materially more assertive towards the United States.
(with Rachel Myrick)
Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE. Appendix available HERE
Journal of Politics, Forthcoming. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/726926
How do foreign rivals perceive and respond to heightened domestic polarization in the United States? The conventional thinking is that polarization weakens and distracts the U.S., emboldening its adversaries. However, untested assumptions underlie this claim. We use two strategies to explore mechanisms linking domestic polarization and international rivalry. First, we field a survey experiment in China to examine how heightening perceptions of U.S. polarization affects public attitudes towards Chinese foreign policy. Second, we investigate how U.S. rival governments responded to an episode of extreme partisanship: the U.S. Capitol attacks on January 6, 2021. Drawing on ICEWS event data, we explore whether foreign rivals increased hostility towards the U.S. following the Capitol riots. Both studies fail to show robust evidence for the emboldening hypothesis. Extreme polarization has other negative consequences for American foreign policy, but we find no evidence that it makes adversaries materially more assertive towards the United States.
Governmental Responses to Terrorism in Autocracies: Evidence from China
(with Philip Potter)
Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE. Appendix available HERE
British Journal of Political Science 52, no. 1 (2022): 358-380. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000514.
Autocracies are widely assumed to have a counterterrorism advantage because they can censor media and are insulated from public opinion, thereby depriving terrorists of both their audience and political leverage. However, institutionalized autocracies such as China draw legitimacy from public approval and feature partially free media environments, meaning that their information strategies must be much more sophisticated than simple censorship. To better understand the strategic considerations that govern decisions about transparency in this context, we explore the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) treatment of domestic terrorist incidents in the official party mouthpiece—the People’s Daily. Drawing on original, comprehensive datasets of all known Uyghur terrorist violence in China and the official coverage of that violence, we demonstrate that the CCP promptly acknowledges terrorist violence only when both domestic and international conditions are favorable. We attribute this pattern to the entrenched prioritization of short-term social stability over longer-term legitimacy.
(with Philip Potter)
Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE. Appendix available HERE
British Journal of Political Science 52, no. 1 (2022): 358-380. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000514.
Autocracies are widely assumed to have a counterterrorism advantage because they can censor media and are insulated from public opinion, thereby depriving terrorists of both their audience and political leverage. However, institutionalized autocracies such as China draw legitimacy from public approval and feature partially free media environments, meaning that their information strategies must be much more sophisticated than simple censorship. To better understand the strategic considerations that govern decisions about transparency in this context, we explore the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) treatment of domestic terrorist incidents in the official party mouthpiece—the People’s Daily. Drawing on original, comprehensive datasets of all known Uyghur terrorist violence in China and the official coverage of that violence, we demonstrate that the CCP promptly acknowledges terrorist violence only when both domestic and international conditions are favorable. We attribute this pattern to the entrenched prioritization of short-term social stability over longer-term legitimacy.
Working Paper/Work in Progress
The Strategic Logic of China’s Counter-Terrorism Foreign Policy
(with Philip Potter)
(Under Review, R & R)
Counter-terrorism joint military exercises (CT-JMEs) with foreign forces provide a unique window into China’s capabilities and policies. Drawing on an original dataset of China's CT-JMEs from 2002-2016, we argue that a series of competing priorities drive the Chinese approach to CT-JMEs. China relies on CT-JMEs as a dual-use tool for burnishing relationships with strategic partners and enhancing the combat readiness of the PLA. At the same time, concerns about the potential for blowback from militant organizations conditions Beijing’s impulse to engage in these exercises. These countervailing incentives and constraints lead China to invest in CT-JMEs as a form of military diplomacy, but selectively. Two patterns emerge from the data that lend support to this argument. First, China has cautiously targeted CT-JME engagement only toward countries where the threat of militancy is high, and China has significant economic interests. Second, countries that spend more time on CT-JMEs with China are more aligned with China’s diplomatic preferences at the United Nations, suggesting that Beijing’s approach has been effective.
(with Philip Potter)
(Under Review, R & R)
Counter-terrorism joint military exercises (CT-JMEs) with foreign forces provide a unique window into China’s capabilities and policies. Drawing on an original dataset of China's CT-JMEs from 2002-2016, we argue that a series of competing priorities drive the Chinese approach to CT-JMEs. China relies on CT-JMEs as a dual-use tool for burnishing relationships with strategic partners and enhancing the combat readiness of the PLA. At the same time, concerns about the potential for blowback from militant organizations conditions Beijing’s impulse to engage in these exercises. These countervailing incentives and constraints lead China to invest in CT-JMEs as a form of military diplomacy, but selectively. Two patterns emerge from the data that lend support to this argument. First, China has cautiously targeted CT-JME engagement only toward countries where the threat of militancy is high, and China has significant economic interests. Second, countries that spend more time on CT-JMEs with China are more aligned with China’s diplomatic preferences at the United Nations, suggesting that Beijing’s approach has been effective.
Today Ukraine Tomorrow Taiwan? Assessing the Transferability of US Reputation for Resolve Across International Crises
(With Rachel Myrick)
(Under Review)
When does a state’s reputation for resolve transfer across international crises? We propose three assumptions underlying ``Transferability of Reputation.” First, a defender’s response to a crisis leads a new challenger to reassess the defender's reputation reputation formation. Second, the new challenger sees the crisis as comparable to a future crisis situational comparability. Third, anticipating the defender's response, the challenger changes its preferences adversary-oriented decision-making. We test the theory by examining whether the initial U.S. response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine impacted Chinese assertiveness towards Taiwan. A framing experiment in China in March 2022 finds that a weak U.S. response to Russian aggression decreases the U.S.’s general reputation for resolve. However, it neither substantially shapes expectations about how the U.S. would respond to a Taiwan crisis nor changes Chinese attitudes towards Taiwan. Our results demonstrate limitations of transferability of reputation arguments, which have been invoked to justify force in foreign affairs.
(With Rachel Myrick)
(Under Review)
When does a state’s reputation for resolve transfer across international crises? We propose three assumptions underlying ``Transferability of Reputation.” First, a defender’s response to a crisis leads a new challenger to reassess the defender's reputation reputation formation. Second, the new challenger sees the crisis as comparable to a future crisis situational comparability. Third, anticipating the defender's response, the challenger changes its preferences adversary-oriented decision-making. We test the theory by examining whether the initial U.S. response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine impacted Chinese assertiveness towards Taiwan. A framing experiment in China in March 2022 finds that a weak U.S. response to Russian aggression decreases the U.S.’s general reputation for resolve. However, it neither substantially shapes expectations about how the U.S. would respond to a Taiwan crisis nor changes Chinese attitudes towards Taiwan. Our results demonstrate limitations of transferability of reputation arguments, which have been invoked to justify force in foreign affairs.
Wait for the Right Time: Leader's Tenure and International Cooperation
Work in Progress
Are hawkish or dovish leaders more likely to be approached by foreign adversaries for rapprochement? The hawk’s advantage argument suggests that hawkish leaders are more likely to be approached, as they are seen as better positioned domestically to pursue coop- eration. However, evidence showing that dovish leaders are more successful in extracting concessions complicates this picture. This paper aims to reconcile these conflicting tenden- cies. I argue that the hawk’s advantage does exist but is most pronounced early in a leader’s tenure when voters rely more on reputation to assess competence and preferences. Over time, even doves can build a reputation for competence, enhancing their ability to justify conciliatory efforts. As a result, foreign adversaries, who may inherently trust doves more, might delay engagement with them. This argument is tested using both observational data and a survey experiment. Observational evidence strongly supports the idea that doves are more likely to be approached for cooperation than hawks, but only later in their tenure. The survey experiment yields mixed results. While there is suggestive evidence that the hawk’s advantage diminishes for longer-serving leaders, the perceived experience associated with longer tenure does not significantly affect respondents’ assessment of the leader’s policy credibility.
Work in Progress
Are hawkish or dovish leaders more likely to be approached by foreign adversaries for rapprochement? The hawk’s advantage argument suggests that hawkish leaders are more likely to be approached, as they are seen as better positioned domestically to pursue coop- eration. However, evidence showing that dovish leaders are more successful in extracting concessions complicates this picture. This paper aims to reconcile these conflicting tenden- cies. I argue that the hawk’s advantage does exist but is most pronounced early in a leader’s tenure when voters rely more on reputation to assess competence and preferences. Over time, even doves can build a reputation for competence, enhancing their ability to justify conciliatory efforts. As a result, foreign adversaries, who may inherently trust doves more, might delay engagement with them. This argument is tested using both observational data and a survey experiment. Observational evidence strongly supports the idea that doves are more likely to be approached for cooperation than hawks, but only later in their tenure. The survey experiment yields mixed results. While there is suggestive evidence that the hawk’s advantage diminishes for longer-serving leaders, the perceived experience associated with longer tenure does not significantly affect respondents’ assessment of the leader’s policy credibility.
A Survey Experiment on Discriminate Targeting Strategy in Diplomatic Communication
Work in Progress
The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an increasingly escalatory “war of words” between China and the US. A clear targeting pattern has emerged on both sides. US officials have consistently targeted “the CCP (Chinese Communist Party)” instead of “China” in their public statements and condemnations. In response, the Chinese side also moved away from “the US” to “Republican politicians” and then to specific persons like “Pompeo” and “Navarro” in their official statements. The rationale behind the discriminate targeting strategy is straightforward: delegitimize the ruler without alienating the ruled (or at least part of the ruled). However, despite the intuition, relatively little is known about the real effect of discriminate targeting on the public opinion of the target state. Not only might the effect of the discriminate targeting be too weak to make any substantive difference, but also the strategy could backfire, fueling animosity and promoting unity in the target state if the strategy is perceived as a deliberate attempt to sow dissension. Preliminary results from a survey experiment that uses a 2020 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) module indicate that this strategy is partially working. Respondents who voted for Clinton in 2016 tend to view China as significantly less threatening when the Chinese official condemnation targets Republican politicians as opposed to the United States as a nation.
Work in Progress
The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an increasingly escalatory “war of words” between China and the US. A clear targeting pattern has emerged on both sides. US officials have consistently targeted “the CCP (Chinese Communist Party)” instead of “China” in their public statements and condemnations. In response, the Chinese side also moved away from “the US” to “Republican politicians” and then to specific persons like “Pompeo” and “Navarro” in their official statements. The rationale behind the discriminate targeting strategy is straightforward: delegitimize the ruler without alienating the ruled (or at least part of the ruled). However, despite the intuition, relatively little is known about the real effect of discriminate targeting on the public opinion of the target state. Not only might the effect of the discriminate targeting be too weak to make any substantive difference, but also the strategy could backfire, fueling animosity and promoting unity in the target state if the strategy is perceived as a deliberate attempt to sow dissension. Preliminary results from a survey experiment that uses a 2020 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) module indicate that this strategy is partially working. Respondents who voted for Clinton in 2016 tend to view China as significantly less threatening when the Chinese official condemnation targets Republican politicians as opposed to the United States as a nation.
Dueling in the Gray Zone: China’s Low-Intensity Maritime Conflicts Explained
(with Frances Yaping Wang)
Work in Progress
Who and what drive China’s maritime behaviors in offshore disputes? This paper investigates the fluctuations in China’s paramilitary operations, focusing on low-intensity maritime provocations that have supplanted traditional militarized interstate conflicts. We argue that two distinct decision-making processes are at play: one at the central state level, driven by national security concerns, and the other at the operational level, influenced by routine formalities. The international legal implications of maritime activities determine the level of provocation, and thus which process is at work. Empirical tests on monthly frequencies of Chinese maritime patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands since 2012 reveal that incursions within 12 nautical miles, with higher provocation levels, decrease during diplomatic summits that require top leaders’ attention. Conversely, patrols within the contiguous zone (12-24 nautical miles) with lower provocation levels increase during routinized operational procedures such as fishing bans, but they do so less frequently when important diplomatic summits are also taking place. These findings highlight the importance of national interests and operational factors in shaping China’s maritime conflict behaviors.
(with Frances Yaping Wang)
Work in Progress
Who and what drive China’s maritime behaviors in offshore disputes? This paper investigates the fluctuations in China’s paramilitary operations, focusing on low-intensity maritime provocations that have supplanted traditional militarized interstate conflicts. We argue that two distinct decision-making processes are at play: one at the central state level, driven by national security concerns, and the other at the operational level, influenced by routine formalities. The international legal implications of maritime activities determine the level of provocation, and thus which process is at work. Empirical tests on monthly frequencies of Chinese maritime patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands since 2012 reveal that incursions within 12 nautical miles, with higher provocation levels, decrease during diplomatic summits that require top leaders’ attention. Conversely, patrols within the contiguous zone (12-24 nautical miles) with lower provocation levels increase during routinized operational procedures such as fishing bans, but they do so less frequently when important diplomatic summits are also taking place. These findings highlight the importance of national interests and operational factors in shaping China’s maritime conflict behaviors.