Domestic Polarization and International Rivalry

Online Appendix

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Part I: Survey Experiment

Part II: Observational Analysis

I-A. Survey Experiment Details

Survey Overview & Sample

For this project, we fielded a public opinion survey online to a sample of 2046 adults living in mainland China from March 28-31, 2022. The survey questionnaire, hypotheses, and proposed analyses were preregistered with the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) registry hosted by the Center for Open Science Foundation (OSF).[1] The survey was distributed to an opt-in online panel of adults via the survey firm Qualtrics. We used quota sampling to match our sample to the 2020 Chinese National Census on two target demographics: age and sex.

Category		Target	Actual
AGE	18-34	30%	30.4%
	35-54	32%	32.4%
	55+	38%	37.3%
SEX	Male	48%	48%
	Female	52%	52%

While this sample is nationally representative on age and sex, it is of course not fully representative on other demographic characteristics. Comparing our survey data with the 2020 Chinese Census[2], we see that relative to the national population, adults in our sample are:

- More likely to live in urban areas. In the 2020 Census, 63.89% of respondents lived in urban areas, whereas 97.3% of our sample lived in urban areas.
- Somewhat more likely to be ethnically Han. In the 2020 Census, 91.1% of the population is ethnically Han, whereas 96.7% of our population is Han.
- More likely to receive higher education. In the 2020 Census, about 15.47% of the population have college degrees, whereas 78.6% of our sample have college degrees.
- More likely to reside in North China. In the 2020 Census, the population lived in the following regions: East China (30.04%), North China (12.01%), Central and South (29.07%), Northeast (6.99%), Southwest (14.55%), and Northwest (7.34%). In our sample, the regional distribution is: East China (28.69%), North China (28.54%), Central and South (22.73%), Northeast (4.30%), Southwest (11.53%), and Northwest (3.91%).

Ethics

The project was reviewed by Duke University's Campus Institutional Review Board (IRB), protocol no. 2022-0343. In designing our survey, we follow suggested best practices in survey research

[1] The preregistration is available here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/N8X5B.

[2] Census data is from the 2020 Seventh National Population Census in China, as published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (http://www.stats.gov.cn/).

in China and take care to minimize any potential risk to participants. First, we inform participants that the study is being conducted by university researchers and their responses will be anonymous and only used for academic research. Participants are made aware of the content of the survey in advance and choose whether or not to participate. They are able to exit the survey at any time and can skip any question they prefer not to answer. Second, we do not collect individually identifiable information from survey participants. We program the survey and then partner with Qualtrics to distribute the link to members of its online panel living in China.

Third, we opt not to ask questions deemed politically sensitive in this context. The survey focuses on Chinese attitudes towards American politics and foreign policy. These topics are regularly discussed by Chinese officials and featured in major media outlets in China. We avoid questions about attitudes towards the Chinese government and political leadership as well as foreign policy issue areas that may be sensitive or controversial. In survey items related to Chinese foreign policy, we generally frame the questions to ask respondents what they think China *should* do in the future rather than asking for an evaluation of existing policy.

Finally, we do not engage in any deception in the survey. The information provided to respondents in the polarization prime draws on language from real media reports. In our IRB submission, however, we requested to waive one element of informed consent: disclosure of our university affiliation prior to the survey. Our concern was that respondents may not be truthful in their answers if they are aware that survey was being conducted by researchers based at American universities. In addition to concerns about potential non-response bias, respondents could exaggerate their unfavorability towards American foreign policy if they perceived the survey to be affiliated with an American institution. Omitting institutional affiliation in the informed consent declaration is consistent with best practices in recent survey research conducted in China related to politics and international relations.[3]

[3]See, for example, Gruffydd-Jones (2019); Jee and Zhang (2021); Weiss and Dafoe (2019).

I-B. Survey Instrument

The survey instrument is described below. The survey was only distributed to respondents in Chinese. The English translation of the text is in *italics*.:

consent_text:

You are invited to participate in a study about your attitudes towards American foreign policy and Chinese foreign policy. Your participation will take approximately 10-15 minutes.

我们邀请您参加此次问卷调查。此问卷旨在了解您对于美国外交政策和中国外交政策的看法。完成此次问卷大约需要10-15分钟。

The data collected from this survey is collected by university researchers and will only be used for academic research. Your answers will be confidential. We will not ask for your name or any information that might identify you.

调查结果将会被大学研究员收集，并将只用于学术目的。我们不会询问您的姓名或其他任何可能确认您身份的信息。

Your participation is completely voluntary. You may choose to skip questions or not participate in the study or to withdraw at any time. In order to receive compensation for participating in this study, you must proceed to the final screen of the survey.

参见本次调查完全基于自愿。您可以拒绝参见本调查，或者在调查中的任何时候选择退出。如果您完成了本次调查，您会收到指定数额的奖励。

If you have any questions, you may contact the researchers at: zmyj@yahoo.com

如果您对本研究有任何问题，请联系：zmyj@yahoo.com

Do you agree to these terms?

- *Yes / No*

您是否同意以上条款?

- 是/否

If respondents consent to participating in the survey, they next answer a series of demographic questions.

sex: *What is your sex?*

- *Male / Female*

sex: 您的性别是?

- 男/女

age: *What is your age?*

age: 您的年龄是?

income: *What is your annual household income?*

- *Less than 10,000 CNY / 10,000 CNY – 50,000 CNY / 50,000 CNY – 100,000 CNY / 100,000 CNY – 150,000 CNY / 150,000 CNY – 200,000 CNY / 200,000 CNY – 300,000 CNY / 300,000 CNY – 500,000 CNY / 500,000 CNY – 1,000,000 CNY / More than 1,000,000 CNY / Prefer not to answer*

income: 您家庭年收入的范围是多少?

- 1万元人民币以下/ 1万到5万元人民币之间/ 5万到10万元人民币之间/ 10万到15万元人民币之间/ 15万到20万元人民币之间/ 20万到30万元人民币之间/ 30万到50万元人民币之间/ 50万到100万元人民币之间/ 100万元人民币以上/ 选择不回答

household: *What is the number of household members in your house including children?*

- *1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 or more*

household: 您的家庭成员有几人（包括子女）?

- 1人/ 2人/ 3人/ 4人/ 5人或者以上

intaffairs: *How much time on average do you spend each day on reading news about international affairs?*

- *None / Less than 30 minutes / 30 minutes to an hour / More than an hour*

intaffairs: 您平均每天花费多长时间阅读有关国际事务的新闻?

- 从不/ 少于30分钟/ 30分钟到1个小时/ 1个小时以上

intaffairs_source: *From which of the following news sources do you often get information about international affairs? (Select all that apply)*

- *Domestic internet International internet Local TV news National TV news Local radio news broadcasts National radio news broadcasts City newspapers Provincial newspapers National newspapers Little papers [xiaobao] Printed magazines*

intaffairs_source: 您从以下哪些新闻来源获取有关国际事务的信息? （请选择所有适用选项）

- 国内网站/ 国际网站/ 地方电视新闻/ 央视新闻/ 地方广播电台/ 中央广播电台/ 地方报纸/ 省市级报纸/ 国家级报纸/ 小报/ 印刷杂志

intaffairs_primary: *Among the following news sources, which one do you rely on most to get information about international affairs? (Select only one)*

- *Domestic internet International internet Local TV news National TV news Local radio news broadcasts National radio news broadcasts City newspapers Provincial newspapers National newspapers Little papers [xiaobao] Printed magazines*

intaffairs_primary: 您最依赖于以下哪个新闻来源获取有关国际事务的信息？（请选择一项）

- 国内网站/ 国际网站/ 地方电视新闻/ 央视新闻/ 地方广播电台/ 中央广播电台/ 地方报纸/ 省市级报纸/ 国家级报纸/ 小报/ 印刷杂志

us_travel: *Have you traveled to the United States?*

- *Yes / No*

us_travel: 您是否曾经到过美国?

- 是/ 否

us_time: *How much time in total have you been in the United States?*

- *None / Less than one month / 1-6 months / 6-12 months / 1-3 years / More than 3 years*

us_time: 您累计在美国待过多长时间?

- 从未到过美国/ 少于1个月/ 1个月到6个月/ 6个月1年/ 1年到3年/ 3年以上

region: *Which region do you live in?*

- *Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang) North China (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia) Northwest (Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang) Southwest (Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet) Central and South (Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan) East China (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong)*

region: 您居住在哪个地区?

- 东北（辽宁，吉林，黑龙江）/ 华北（北京，天津，河北，山西，内蒙古）/ 西北（陕西，甘肃，青海，宁夏，新疆）/ 西南（重庆，四川，贵州，云南，西藏）/ 中南（河南，湖北，湖南，广东，广西，海南）/ 华东（上海，江苏，浙江，安徽，福建，江西，山东）

urban: *Are you an urban or rural resident?*

- *Urban / Rural*

urban: 您居住在城市还是农村?

- 城市/ 农村

hawkish: *In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals?*

- *Too much / Too little / About right / Don't know / Prefer not to answer*

hawkish: 一般来看，您认为中国在实现外交目标方面过多地依赖军事力量，过少地依赖军事，还是不多不少地依赖军事力量?

- 过多依赖/ 过少依赖/ 不多不少/ 不知道/ 选择不回答

education: *What is your highest education level?*

- *No formal education / Primary school / Junior Secondary School / Senior Secondary School (including Secondary Technical School) / College (including Junior College) / Master / Doctoral*

education: 您的最高学历是?

- 没有接受过正规教育/ 小学毕业/ 初中毕业/ 高中毕业（包括中等职业学校）/ 大学毕业（包括大专）/ 硕士/ 博士

ethnicity: *What is your ethnicity?*

- *Han / Minority / Prefer not to answer*

ethnicity: 您的民族是?

- 汉族/ 少数民族/ 选择不回答

ccp: *Do you belong to the Communist Party?*

- *Yes / No / Prefer not to answer*

ccp: 您是否是中共党员?

- 是/ 否/ 选择不回答

pol_views: *How would you describe your political views?*

- *Very conservative / Somewhat conservative / Moderate / Somewhat liberal / Very Liberal / Don't know / Prefer not to answer*

pol_views: 总的来说，您认为您的政治观点是?

- 非常保守/ 比较保守/ 温和的/ 比较开放的/ 非常开放的/ 不知道/ 选择不回答

At the end of the demographic questions, survey respondents must pass a simple attention check. Respondents who do not answer this question correctly are screened out of the survey before the experiment begins.

attn: *Many people like sports. We are checking to make sure you're reading carefully. Instead of clicking on your favorite sport, please select the third answer out of the four choices below.*

- *Basketball / Table Tennis / Football (Soccer) / Badminton*

attn: 很多人喜爱体育运动。我们想确认您是否在认真阅读本问卷。在下列选项中，不论您最喜欢的运动是什么，请选择第三个选项。

- 篮球/ 乒乓球/ 足球/ 羽毛球

The experiment embedded in the survey is a priming experiment. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of two conditions: treatment or control. Respondents in the treatment condition read a prime about extreme polarization in the American politics and society, while respondents in the control condition move to the outcome questions without reading a prime. The prime emphasizes many dimensions of polarization, including both ideological and affective polarization, as well as polarization among both politicians and the public. We also highlight a recent episode closely linked to extreme polarization in American politics: the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol. To closely reflect information that survey respondents receive in the real world, we construct the text of the prime based on Chinese media sources. We add images from the same sources to make the prime more engaging for survey respondents. The phrases and images we use are directly adapted from news articles published in *The People's Daily*, the largest newspaper in China. The text of the prime is below. Footnotes link to news articles from which language was directly adapted.

We would like to start by providing some information about politics in the United States, based on news reports. Please read this information carefully because you will be asked questions about it.

我们首先将会为您提供一些关于美国政治的信息。这些信息是摘自新闻报道。请认真阅读这些信息，因为之后的一些问题会基于这些信息。

- *The United States of America has become the "Divided States of America."*[4]
- 美利坚合众国现在已经变成了"美利坚分裂国"。
- *American society has long been haunted by polarization and division, but today, the two major political parties – the Republican Party and the Democratic Party – disagree more than ever.*[5]
- 美国社会长期以来受内部分裂的困扰。但是美国两党（共和党和民主党）的这种分裂从未像今天这样白热化。

[4]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0817/c90000-9884771.html

[5]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0517/c90000-9850610.html. Image from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0804/c90000-9880185.html

[NEW SCREEN]

- *There has been an increasingly stark disagreement between Democrats and Republicans on economy, racial justice, climate change, law enforcement, international engagement and a long list of other issues.*[6]
- 众所周知，美国两党在经济、种族、气候变化、执法、国际参与以及其他一系列问题上的分歧日益明显。
- *Members of the U.S. Congress vote more along party lines on many important and major public matters.*[7]
- 美国议员们在诸多重大公共事项上更多地从党派利益出发投票。
- *Majorities of Americans describe both parties as "too extreme."*[8]
- 多数美国民众用"太极端"来描述美国两党。

[NEW SCREEN]

- *This disagreement between Democrats and Republicans has gradually changed from policy differences to identity battles.*[9]
- 美国两党间的政策之争日益变为身份之争。
- *Today, about 80% of voters generally hate each other's political parties.*[10]

[6]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0517/c90000-9850610.html
[7]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0517/c90000-9850610.html
[8]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0517/c90000-9850610.html. Image from: http://en.people.cn/NMediaFile/2021/0301/FOREIGN202103011637000088715563205.jpg
[9]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0517/c90000-9850610.html
[10]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/1207/c90000-9929403.html

- 今天，有将近*80%*的投票者互相仇恨对方的党派。
- *Political hatred sparked by political fanaticism has become the root cause of constant social unrest and division in the U.S.*[11]
- 政治狂热激发的政治仇恨已经成为美国社会持续动荡撕裂的根源。

[NEW SCREEN]

- *On January 2021, violent demonstrators stormed the U.S. Capitol after refusing to accept the results of the 2020 U.S. presidential election.*[12]
- *2021*年*1*月*6*日，由于不愿接受美国*2020*年总统选举结果，暴力示威者们冲击了美国国会大厦。
- *The angry mob tried to stop the certification of the presidential election.*[13]
- 愤怒的暴徒们试图阻止国会议员认证美国总统大选结果。
- *This attack showed how deeply polarized the United States is.*[14]
- 这次冲击昭示了美国极度分裂的现状。

[11]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0517/c90000-9850610.html. Image from: http://en.people.cn/NMediaFile/2021/0120/FOREIGN202101200913000062595806985.jpg

[12]Text adapted from: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/1208/c90000-9930027.html

[13]Text adapted: http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/1213/c90000-9931847.html

[14]Image from: http://www.people.com.cn/mediafile/pic/BIG/20210325/96/13896115065572479036.jpg

Both treatment and control groups then answer outcome questions about the United States and China. The first question asks respondents to evaluate the relative strength or weakness of the United States.

us_strength: *In the next few years, do you think the United States is likely to be:*

- *Much weaker / Somewhat weaker / Neither weaker nor stronger / Somewhat stronger / Much stronger / I don't know (NA)*

us_strength: 在未来几年，您认为美国的综合国力会如何变化?

- 比现在弱很多/ 比现在弱一些/ 维持现状/ 比现在强一些/ 比现在强很多/ 不知道

Then, respondents make predictions about what American foreign policy will look like in the next few years. For each question, they quantify how certain they are about their prediction using a slider bar, where higher values indicate more certainty. These questions read:

us_active: *In the next few years, do you think the United States is likely to be:*

- *Much less active in global affairs / Somewhat less active in global affairs / About the same / Somewhat more active in global affairs / Much more active in global affairs*

us_active: 在未来几年，您认为美国在国际事务的参与上会:

- 在很大程度上减少参与国际事务/ 在一定程度上减少参与国际事务/ 保持不变/ 在一定程度上更积极的参与国际事务/ 在很大程度上更积极的参与国际事务

us_active_conf: *How confident are you about your answer to the previous question?*

- *Slider Bar: 0 (Not at All Confident) to 100 (Completely Confident)*

us_active_conf: 对于上一个问题中您所做出的预测，您有多大的把握?

- 0 (完全没有信心) to 100 (完全有信心)

[NEW SCREEN]

us_assertive: *In the next few years, do you think U.S. foreign policy towards China is likely to be:*

- *Much less assertive / Somewhat less assertive / About the same / Somewhat assertive / Much more assertive*

us_assertive: 在未来几年，您认为美国对待中国的外交政策会:

- 在很大程度上有所缓和/ 在一定程度上有所缓和/ 保持不变/ 在一定程度上更加强硬/ 在很大程度上更加强硬

us_assertive_conf: *How confident are you about your answer to the previous question?*

- *Slider Bar: 0 (Not at All Confident) to 100 (Completely Confident)*

us_assertive_conf: 对于上一个问题中您所做出的预测，您有多大的把握?

- 0 (完全没有信心) to 100 (完全有信心)

Next, respondents are asked what China should do in foreign policy in the next few years. The question reads :

china_assertive: *In the next few years, do you think Chinese foreign policy towards the United States should be:*

- *Much less assertive / Somewhat less assertive / About the same / Somewhat more assertive / Much more assertive*

china_assertive: 在未来的几年中，您认为中国对待美国的外交政策应该:

- 在很大程度上有所缓和/ 在一定程度上有所缓和/ 保持不变/ 在一定程度上更加强硬/ 在很大程度上更加强硬

The last set of outcome questions asks about respondent attitudes towards different issues in the U.S.-China relationship. These issues are presented in random order to respondents in a matrix format, with the options: *Much less assertive*, *Somewhat less assertive*, *About the same*, *Somewhat more assertive*, *Much more assertive*. The text reads:

In your opinion, in the next few years, when competing with the United States on the following issues, should Chinese foreign policy be:

	Much less assertive	*Somewhat less assertive*	*About the same*	*Somewhat more assertive*	*Much more assertive*
Taiwan					
South China Sea					
Cybersecurity					
Trade and Supply Chain					
Global Leadership					
Outerspace					

在未来几年中，同美国在下列事务的博弈中，您认为中国应该：

	在很大程度上有所缓和	在一定程度上有所缓和	保持不变	在一定程度上更加强硬	在很大程度上更加强硬
台湾					
南中国海					
网络安全					
贸易与供应链					
全球领导力					
外太空					

On a new screen, respondents see two more matrix questions with the same six issues. They are asked: "*In your opinion, how important are the following issues for China?*" [您认为下列事务对中国的重要性是多少?] and *In your opinion, how important are the following issues for the United States?*" [您认为下列事务对美国的重要性是多少?] Participants rate the importance of each issue on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 indicating "Not Important at All" and 5 indicating "Very Important."

After the respondent completes the outcome questions, we evaluate their perception of polarization in the U.S.

parties_us: *The United States has two major political parties: the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. How often would you say these parties agree?*

- *Almost Always / Sometimes / Rarely / Almost Never / I don't know*

parties_us: 美国有两个主要政党：共和党和民主党。您认为他们在何种程度上互相同意彼此?

- 几乎总是互相同意/ 有时互相同意/ 很少互相同意/ 几乎从不互相同意/ 不知道

At the end of the survey, we further ask respondents how they interpret the translation of the word "assertive."

assertive_def: *We used the word "assertive" a lot in this survey and we want to know how respondents interpret this word. What do you think best describes a more assertive Chinese foreign policy?*

- *Defend China's interests more resolutely. / Defend China's interests more actively. / Defend China's interests more aggressively. / Expand China's influence more resolutely. / Expand China's influence more actively. / Expand China's influence more aggressively. / Don't know*

assertive_def: 在本次问卷中我们多次提及"强硬"一词。我们想了解您是如何理解该词的。在下列选项中，您认为最能准确描述更加强硬的中国外交政策的一项是?

- 在维护中国利益方面更加坚定/ 在维护中国利益方面更加积极/ 在维护中国利益方面更加具有攻击性/ 在拓展中国影响力方面更加坚定/ 在拓展中国影响力方面更加积极/ 在拓展中国影响力方面更加具有攻击性/ 不知道

I-C. Sample Quality & Respondent Attentiveness

Increases in fraudulent responses in surveys fielded online raise concerns about data quality in online surveys (Aronow et al. 2020; Newman et al. 2021). This concern is especially relevant to our paper because the key result in the survey experiment is a null result: priming U.S. polarization appears to have no effect on respondent attitudes towards assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy. It would be problematic if our sample was "poor quality" (i.e., if there was a sizeable portion of our sample made up of bots and/or inattentive respondents), as this could induce measurement error. This appendix explains what we did to rule out that possibility through survey design and assessments of sample quality.

First, we mitigated concerns about response quality through elements of the survey design. We kept the survey questions short and simple, and tried to make the content stimulating for survey respondents. We also increased engagement with the treatment condition by using visual cues and images (see survey instrument in Appendix B). Next, we screened out potential bots and inattentive respondents before delivering the treatment. To screen out bots, we asked respondents to complete a reCAPTCHA question before entering the survey. To screen out inattentive respondents, we embedded a simple attention check within the first few minutes of the survey. This attention check question is:

attn: *Many people like sports. We are checking to make sure you're reading carefully. Instead of clicking on your favorite sport, please select the third answer out of the four choices below.*

- *Basketball / Table Tennis / Football (Soccer) / Badminton*

Respondents who did not answer "Football (Soccer)" were screened out of the survey before the experiment started. Their responses were not included in our target quotas or in our final analyses.[15] Note that we screened out these respondents *before* the treatment, since including only responses from survey participants who pass attention checks and/or manipulation checks after the treatment can be a form of post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres 2018).

After collecting the survey data, we performed other checks for engagement and attentiveness. To stay consistent with our pre-analysis plan, we do not further modify our sample beyond the screener questions we initially proposed. First, we checked for evidence that respondents read the polarization prime by looking at the length of time respondents spent on the treatment. As Figure 1 shows, the median respondent spent 64.61 seconds reading the prime. Second, we checked for evidence that the treatment updated respondent's perceptions about the amount of relative agreement between the two political parties in the United States. After answering all the outcome questions, respondents in both groups answer the following question:

parties_us: *The United States has two major political parties: the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. How often would you say these parties agree?*

- *Almost Always / Sometimes / Rarely / Almost Never / I don't know*

[15] 6% of the initial sample did not pass the attention check, and therefore did not move forward in the survey. We note that this figure is significantly better than comparable online samples of U.S. adults (e.g., Aronow et al. 2020).



Figure 1: Time (in Seconds) Survey Respondents Spent Reading Polarization Prime

We asked this question *after* asking respondents about foreign policy outcomes in order to avoid priming respondents in the control group to think about polarization before answering outcome questions. In our pre-analysis plan, we noted that we saw this question as an indirect and somewhat difficult manipulation check because simply bringing up political parties in the U.S. could cause respondents who were not primed to think about polarization to consider it. Nevertheless, consistent with our expectations, we still find evidence that respondents in the treatment group are less likely to believe that political parties in the U.S. agree. Table 1 presents the results of a logistic regression model, where the dependent variable is coded 1 if a respondent's answer is "Almost Always" or "Sometimes" and 0 otherwise.[16] On average, respondents in the treatment group are 5 percentage points less likely to believe that political parties in the U.S. agree.

Table 1: How Often Would You Say These Parties Agree?

	Dependent variable:
	Almost Always/Sometimes
Treatment	-0.191^{**}
	(0.093)
Constant	-0.477^{***}
	(0.065)
Observations	1,993
Log Likelihood	−1,301.041
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,606.083
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, we checked for other inconsistencies in responses using a different set of demographic questions that were not directly related to the treatment. The survey asks respondents two questions about travel to the U.S. The first question says: "Have you traveled to the United States?" On the next screen, we ask: "How much time in total have you been in the United States?" We

[16]Respondents who chose "I don't know" and missing responses are dropped from the model.

check the proportion of respondents in our sample who answer this question consistently (i.e., who respond "No" to the first question and "None" to the second question, or who respond "Yes" to the first question and do not respond "None" to the second question). We find that 2027/2046 respondents answer this question consistently, or 99.1% of our sample, providing further evidence of overall attentiveness. Taking these factors into consideration, we think it is extremely unlikely that the null result in the survey is attributable to poor sample quality.

I-D. Interpretation of "Assertive" Foreign Policy

There are debates around the appropriate translation of the phrase "assertive foreign policy" [强硬的外交政策]. To understand how survey respondents interpret this phrase, we ask the following question at the end of the survey:

assertive_def: *We used the word "assertive" a lot in this survey and we want to know how respondents interpret this word. What do you think best describes a more assertive Chinese foreign policy? [*在本次问卷中我们多次提及"强硬"一词。我们想了解您是如何理解该词的。在下列选项中，您认为最能准确描述更加强硬的中国外交政策的一项是？*]*

- *Defend China's interests more resolutely [*在维护中国利益方面更加坚定*].*
- *Defend China's interests more actively [*在维护中国利益方面更加积极*].*
- *Defend China's interests more aggressively [*在维护中国利益方面更加具有攻击性*].*
- *Expand China's influence more resolutely [*在拓展中国影响力方面更加坚定*].*
- *Expand China's influence more actively [*在拓展中国影响力方面更加积极*].*
- *Expand China's influence more aggressively [*在拓展中国影响力方面更加具有攻击性*].*
- *Don't know [*不知道*]*

The results, depicted in **Figure 2**, show that while there is variation in the interpretation of this phrase, the modal survey respondent interprets it to mean "defend China's interests more resolutely."



Figure 2: Distribution of Respondents' Interpretation of Assertive Chinese Foreign Policy

I-E. Robustness Checks for Survey Experiment

Table 2 replicates the core analyses in the paper that examine whether the polarization prime (*Treatment*) impacts how assertive respondents believe that China should be towards the U.S. Models 1 and 2 use OLS regression, and the dependent variable is constructed using a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from "Much less assertive" (-2) to "Much more assertive" (2). Models 3 and 4 are logit models with a binary dependent variable, where 1 indicates that the respondent thought China should be either "Somewhat more assertive" or "Much more assertive" towards the United States. Models 2 and 4 include a set of pre-registered demographic controls for: sex, age, ethnicity, urban/rural location, and higher education. Across all models, the estimated coefficient on *Treatment* is substantively small and not statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, this is finding is most consistent with the *status quo hypothesis*.

Table 2: Regression Analysis of Preference for Chinese Assertiveness

	Assertiveness of China			
	OLS		Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	−0.006	−0.001	0.052	0.054
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Female		−0.130**		−0.087
		(0.049)		(0.096)
Age (35-54)		0.141*		0.211+
		(0.059)		(0.116)
Age (55 Plus)		−0.097		−0.215+
		(0.064)		(0.124)
Han Ethnic		0.286*		0.626*
		(0.133)		(0.258)
Urban		−0.181		−0.267
		(0.149)		(0.299)
Higher Education		0.029		0.040
		(0.065)		(0.126)
Constant	0.464***	0.404*	0.298***	−0.008
	(0.033)	(0.196)	(0.064)	(0.386)
Observations	2,037	2,000	2,037	2,000
R^2	0.00001	0.014		
Log Likelihood			-1,385.416	-1,347.091

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3 examines the relationship between the polarization prime (*Treatment*) and respondent attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy in the future. All models use OLS regression. The dependent variables are constructed using 5-point Likert scales that range from -2 to 2. In Models 5 and 6, the dependent variable is how strong or weak respondents think the U.S. will be in the next few years (-2 = "Much weaker" and 2 = "Much stronger"). In Models 7 and 8, the dependent variable asks whether respondents think the U.S. will be more or less active in global affairs in the next few years (-2 = "Much less active" and 2 = "Much more active"). In Models 9 and 10, the dependent variable asks whether respondents think the U.S. will be more or less assertive towards China in the next few years (-2 = "Much less assertive" and 2 = "Much more assertive"). Models 6, 8, and 10 contain a set of pre-registered demographic control variables. Across all models, the estimated coefficient on *Treatment* is not statistically significant, indicating that, on average, respondents who were primed to think about polarization in the U.S. did not view U.S. foreign policy differently than those in the control group.

Table 3: Regression Analysis of Perceptions of the U.S. Strength and Foreign Policy

	OLS Model Results					
	U.S. Strength		U.S. Activeness		U.S. Assertiveness	
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	−0.058	−0.055	−0.008	0.0005	−0.022	−0.018
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Female		0.066		−0.001		-0.213^{***}
		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.053)
Age (35-54)		0.007		−0.003		0.164^{**}
		(0.061)		(0.062)		(0.063)
Age (55 Plus)		0.164^{*}		-0.310^{***}		-0.336^{***}
		(0.066)		(0.067)		(0.068)
Han Ethnic		−0.033		-0.251^{+}		-0.421^{**}
		(0.137)		(0.138)		(0.141)
Urban		0.228		−0.009		−0.038
		(0.161)		(0.156)		(0.159)
Higher Education		-0.201^{**}		−0.096		0.029
		(0.068)		(0.068)		(0.070)
Constant	-0.306^{***}	-0.434^{*}	0.022	0.463^{*}	0.012	0.618^{**}
	(0.034)	(0.207)	(0.035)	(0.205)	(0.036)	(0.209)
Observations	2,019	1,982	2,040	2,001	2,040	2,002
R^2	0.001	0.016	0.00001	0.017	0.0001	0.041
Adjusted R^2	0.0002	0.013	-0.0005	0.013	-0.0004	0.037
Note:						$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

I-F. Relative Importance Plots for Foreign Policy Issues

To assess the *selective assertiveness hypothesis*, we needed to identify a set of foreign policy issues that respondents in China perceived as "core" to China's national interests but peripheral to the United States. To do so, we asked respondents to rate the importance of six foreign policy issues to China and to the United States separately on a 1-5 scale, with 1 indicating the issue was "Not Important at All" and 5 indicating it was "Very Important." These issues were:

- Cybersecurity
- Global Leadership
- Outerspace
- South China Sea
- Taiwan
- Trade and Supply Chain

In our pre-analysis plan, we specified that we would use only the control group to construct these relative importance measures.[17] Figure 3 plots the *t-test* of the average difference in relative importance (Importance to China – Importance to the U.S.) of each issue among respondents in the control group (Panel a), treatment group (Panel b), and the full sample (Panel c), respectively. The results show that two issues—Taiwan and South China Sea—are consistently rated as much more important to China relative to the U.S. across all these samples. We therefore label these two issues "core" to China in our analyses.



Figure 3: Relative Importance of Foreign Policy Issues to China vs. U.S. Across Different Samples

[17] The rationale for doing so was to preempt the potential concern that the treatment would impact respondents' assessments of issue importance.

I-G. Perceptions of Volatility in U.S. Foreign Policy

We also considered the possibility that the polarization prime might make respondents believe U.S. foreign policy would be more volatile or uncertain in the future.[18] After asking respondents about U.S. foreign policy—specifically, whether they thought the U.S. would be more/less active in global affairs (US_ACTIVE) and more/less assertive towards China (US_ASSERTIVE)—we asked them how confident they were in each of their answers. Respondents reported their confidence level on a slider bar from 0 ("Not at all confident") to 100 ("Completely confident"). We proposed in our pre-analysis plan that lower confidence levels in the treatment group relative to the control group would indicate that respondents primed to think about U.S. polarization were more uncertain about the future of American foreign policy.

Figure 4 plots the distribution of these outcome questions by respondents' treatment status with the *t-test* result on top of each figure. Overall, we found that the average confidence level for these outcome questions was fairly high across both groups. While respondents in the treatment group tended to be on average slightly less confident about their assessments of U.S. foreign policy, this difference was not statistically significant.



Figure 4: Confidence about Predictions of U.S. Activeness and U.S. Assertiveness Across Treatment and Control Groups

An alternative way to conceptualize uncertainty around the outcome questions is to look at the variance of responses. Table 4 summarizes *F-test* results that show the variance of responses to these two outcome questions are not significantly different in the treatment group relative to the control group.

Table 4: F-test of Perceptions of U.S. Activeness and U.S. Assertiveness

	Var (Control)	Var (Treatment)	F-test
U.S. Activeness	1.244	1.175	F=1.06, p-value=0.355
U.S. Assertiveness	1.311	1.271	F=1.032, p-value=0.62

[18] Our theory proposed two mechanisms that could preserve the stats quo. The first mechanism was that rivals see polarization as increasing volatility in U.S. foreign policy, leading them to adopt a "wait and see" approach.

I-H. Exploratory Analysis of Heterogeneous Effects

While our key results in the survey experiment are null, it is possible that different subsets of the sample could display an emboldening effect. Consistent with our pre-analysis plan, we looked for heterogeneous effects across the following moderator variables (all measured pre-treatment): interest in foreign affairs, previous experience in the U.S., CCP membership, political attitudes, and general hawkishness. These variables were operationalized as follows:

- *High interest in international affairs*: Coded as 1 if respondent reports spending 30 minutes or more each day on reading about foreign affairs and 0 otherwise.
- *Access to International Internet*: Coded as 1 if respondent reports getting news from "International Internet" and 0 otherwise.
- *Internet News*: Coded as 1 if "Domestic Internet" or "International Internet" is the source respondents report getting news from the most and 0 otherwise.
- *Any Experience in the U.S.*: Coded as 1 if respondent answers "Yes" to "Have you traveled to the United States?" and 0 otherwise.
- *Significant Experience in the U.S.*: Coded as 1 if respondent reports spending 1 or more years in the U.S. and 0 otherwise.
- *Communist Party membership*: Coded as 1 if the respondent reports belonging to the Community Party and 0 otherwise.
- *Political ideology*: Coded on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Very Liberal) to 5 (Very Conservative).
- *Hawkishness*: Coded as 1 if the respondent answers that China relies "too little" on military strength to achieve their foreign policy goals and 0 otherwise.

The regression tables show heterogeneous effects by internet and media (Table 5), prior experience in the U.S. (Table 6), and party affiliation and political viewpoints (Table 7). In these three tables, the models are OLS regression models, and the dependent variable (CHINA_ASSERTIVE) is measured on a 5-point Likert scale from "Much less assertive" (-2) to "Much more assertive" (2). The dependent variable is regressed on an indicator for the polarization treatment, the relevant moderator variable, and an interaction of the two. Odd-numbered models contain no demographic controls, and even-numbered models contain demographic controls for sex, age, ethnicity, urban/rural, and higher education.

The primary takeaway from these tables is that we do not find evidence of an *emboldening effect* across different subsets of our sample. In fact, there is no significant heterogeneous effect by these most of these moderators except for hawkishness. The coefficient of the interaction term between *Treatment* and *Hawkish* in Table 7 is significant at 90% confidence level. We further run additional OLS models for hawk and non-hawk subsets of our sample, which are reported in Table 8. The results show that there may be a small dampening effect among the most hawkish members of the sample (Model 3 in Table 8), but the effect becomes insignificant when demographic controls are included.

Table 5: Exploration of Heterogeneous Effects by Access to Internet and Media

	Assertiveness of China					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Polarization Treatment	−0.088	−0.089	0.064	0.057	−0.001	−0.008
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.061)	(0.061)
High Int. News Interest*Treatment	0.109	0.117				
	(0.108)	(0.109)				
Access to Int. Internet*Treatment			−0.119	−0.100		
			(0.095)	(0.095)		
Internet Primary News Source*Treatment					−0.001	0.024
					(0.095)	(0.095)
High Int. News Interest	0.083	0.085				
	(0.077)	(0.078)				
Access to International Internet			0.036	0.025		
			(0.067)	(0.068)		
Internet Primary News Source					0.030	−0.0002
					(0.067)	(0.068)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2,036	2,000	2,035	1,999	2,033	1,997
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.013	−0.001	0.010	−0.001	0.009
Note:						$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 6: Exploration of Heterogeneous Effects by Prior U.S. Experience

	Assertiveness of China			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Polarization Treatment	−0.018	−0.021	−0.004	0.0003
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Any U.S. Travel*Treatment	0.030	0.043		
	(0.093)	(0.094)		
Significant U.S. Travel*Treatment			−0.024	−0.021
			(0.227)	(0.227)
Any U.S. Travel	−0.122^{+}	−0.155*		
	(0.066)	(0.069)		
Significant U.S. Travel			−0.077	−0.092
			(0.159)	(0.160)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2,035	1,999	2,036	2,000
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.012	−0.001	0.010
Note:	$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

Table 7: Exploration of Heterogeneous Effects by Political Affiliation and Ideology

	Assertiveness of China					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Polarization Treatment	0.013	0.005	0.003	0.012	0.080	0.078
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Communist Party*Treatment	−0.036	−0.012				
	(0.100)	(0.100)				
Political Ideology*Treatment			−0.002	−0.003		
			(0.052)	(0.052)		
Hawkish*Treatment					−0.241*	−0.220*
					(0.100)	(0.100)
Communist Party	0.024	0.005				
	(0.071)	(0.072)				
Political Ideology			−0.158***	−0.162***		
			(0.037)	(0.037)		
Hawkish					0.227**	0.256***
					(0.071)	(0.071)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,967	1,936	1,998	1,962	1,969	1,935
Adjusted R^2	−0.001	0.009	0.017	0.029	0.004	0.017
Note:						$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 8: Treatment Effects for Hawk and Non-Hawk Respondents

	Assertiveness of China			
	Non-Hawk		Hawk	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.080	0.078	−0.161*	−0.117
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,296	1,279	673	656
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.020	0.004	0.018
Note:				$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Part II:: Observational Study

II-A. U.S. Rival Media Coverage of January 6th

One possible objection to our use of the January 6, 2021 attacks on the U.S. Capitol as an event that exemplifies "extreme polarization" is that some commentators argue that January 6th did not heighten the salience of U.S. polarization. Instead, some U.S. commentators argue that January 6th generated bipartisanship in Congress and demonstrated the resilience of American democracy.[19]

However, we believe that January 6th is an appropriate event for a real-world test of the *emboldening hypothesis* because stories and images from the Capitol insurrection dominated international news in the days that followed, increasing the salience of U.S. polarization for foreign observers. Media outlets in U.S. rival countries overwhelmingly emphasized the partisan, divisive aspects of January 6th and its aftermath. Moreover, U.S. policymakers explicitly connected January 6th to the emboldening hypothesis (Widakuswara 2022). Below we include examples of coverage of January 6th from major media outlets in three U.S. rival countries—China, Russia, and Iran—to illustrate how the response of foreign official responses and state media likely heightened awareness of U.S. polarization for their respective publics.

China

- The U.S. Capitol attack received extensive coverage in both Chinese official news outlets and pro-government social media accounts, with strict guidelines from the propaganda organ to emphasize democratic dysfunction and U.S. decline. According to Tracy Wen Liu, an investigative report who frequently contributes to *Foreign Policy*, one of her sources in China (a Chinese report) told her that they are required to "focus on how the United States' global reputation would be damaged and deteriorated…and how democracy could be hijacked by a group of uneducated people and how democracy could only be realized when the population is highly educated."[20] For example, one day after the attack, *Global Times*, an official mouthpiece known for its hawkish view, published an article with a title as "A Significant Shame – a Waterloo for the U.S. image."[21]

- Chinese official coverage of the Jan 6th attacks emphasized the U.S. domestic polarization as the root cause. For example, two days after the attack, an article published by China Central Television stated that "while the riots at Capitol Hill already became history, the prologue of Americans against Americans only indicates that the deep division of the U.S. can hardly be healed."[22] Even one year later, on the first anniversary of the Capital attack, *The People's Daily* published an editorial commentary arguing that "the real threat to the U.S. democracy is its domestic politics."[23]

- Chinese news and official statements also tend to draw parallels between the Hong Kong protest in 2019-2020 and the Capitol Hill riots to criticize the U.S. for adopting "double-standards." For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying com-

[19] See, for example, bipartisan Congressional efforts to prevent an event like January 6th from occurring again (Levine 2022).

[20] Accessed at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/08/chinese-media-calls-capitol-riot-world-masterpiece/

[21] Accessed at: https://world.huanqiu.com/article/41Q0uZDkYGN

[22] Accessed at: http://m.news.cctv.com/2021/01/08/ARTIWEb80E1dtnfWAtpVdzmu210108.shtml

[23] Accessed at: http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0113/c1002-32330070.html

mented during a regular press conference: "[I]f you still remember how some U.S. officials, lawmakers and media described what's happened in Hong Kong, you can compare that with the words they've used to described the scenes in Capitol Hill…what's the reason for such a stark difference in the choice of words? Everyone needs to seriously think about it and do some soul-searching on the reason." [24] *Global Times* also tweeted "@Speaker-Pelosi once referred to the Hong Kong riots as "a beautiful sight to behold" — it remains yet to be seen whether she will say the same about the recent developments in Capitol Hill", with side-by-side photos of Hong Kong protesters occupying the city's Legislative Council Complex and the Capitol Hill riots[25]

Russia

- Russian news outlets extensively covered the U.S. Capitol attacks, both as the insurrection was unfolding and in the aftermath. For example, between January 15, 2021 and June 15, 2021, *Russia Today*, the Russian state-controlled international news outlet, published 129 articles tagged as "Capitol Riot News," an average of over 20 articles per month. The articles were accompanied with images depicting rioting, chaos, and partisan violence. [26]

- Russian coverage of the Capitol insurrection stressed democratic dysfunction and partisan divisions in the United States. For example, the lead article about the U.S. Capitol attacks printed in the *The Moscow Times* on January 7, 2021 was titled "Russia Sees U.S. Democracy 'Limping' After Capitol Stormed." Accompanied by a picture of pro-Trump rioters, the article read: "Russia on Thursday pointed to the storming of the U.S. Capitol building as evidence of America's decline, with officials saying its out-of-date electoral system and deep divisions had left its democracy 'limping on both feet.'"[27]

- Russian news repeatedly emphasized hypocrisy of the U.S. in managing its domestic political problems. For example, state-run Russian news agency *TASS* ran a series of articles describing problems with democracy and extreme polarization in the U.S. after the January 6th attacks. A TASS article published on January 28, 2021 read, "Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that "our Western partners, who are so worried about democracy in Russia, [should] concentrate on the settlement of their own problems."[28]

Iran

- In the media and official statements, Iranian leaders emphasized political dysfunction in the U.S. and criticized American-style democracy. For example, the day after the U.S. Capitol riots, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani remarked, "You saw what happened in the United States; what we saw is how false and fragile Western democracy is and how it does not have a strong foundation."[29]

[24] Accessed at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa$_e ng/xwfw_6$65399/$s2510_6$65401/$2511_6$65403/202101/$t20210107_6$93569.$html$

[25] Accessed at: https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1347005117199904768?ref$_s rc = twsrc\%5Etfw$

[26] Accessed at: https://www.rt.com/trends/trump-supporters-capitol-riots-news/

[27] Accessed at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/01/07/russia-sees-us-democracy-limping-after-capitol-stormed-a72551

[28] Accessed at: https://tass.com/politics/1250093

[29] Accessed at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/01/iran-president-rouhani-storming-capitol-building-trump-biden.html

- Iranian news outlets described the January 6th attacks as exemplifying extreme polarization occurring in the U.S. Borrowing language from U.S. academic research on polarization, for example, a February 2021 article in *Tehran Times*, Iran's oldest English-language daily newspaper reported, "Republicans and Democrats are more divided along political and ideological lines – and partisan antipathy has been going deeper and more extensive – than at any point over the last two decades. These trends manifest themselves in myriad ways, both in politics and in everyday life. Many pundits consider the attack on the Capitol building on January 6 as a turning point in the history of the United States."[30]

[30] Accessed from: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/458530/Scholar-says-it-s-not-clear-Biden-can-overcome-polarization-soon

II-B. Parallel Trends Assumption of the DiD Design

In Figure 5, we conduct visual checks of the parallel trend assumption for our DiD design. The plots indicates that this assumption appears to hold fairly well for most window widths. Three time windows (5-Day, 20-Day, and 25-Day) show potential violations of this assumption. Therefore, as discussed in the paper, we are cautious about interpreting any of our estimates as causal.



Figure 5: Visual Check of Parallel Trend Assumption

II-C. Regression Tables Corresponding to Figures in the Main Text

In the main text of the paper, we presented the results from two sets of OLS models that adopt a DiD design graphically. This appendix contains the corresponding regression tables. Table 9 shows OLS models with twelve different time windows before and after Jan 6, in which the treatment group is the U.S. Rivals–the U.S. directed-dyads and the control group is the U.S. Rivals–other states directed-dyads. Table 10 shows another set of OLS models with the same twelve different time windows, but with the U.S. Rivals–U.S. Protégés directed-dyads as the treatment group.

Table 9: OLS Model Results: U.S. Target vs. Other Target

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. Target	0.114	−0.167	−0.301**	−0.369***	−0.416***	−0.347***	−0.286***	−0.265***	−0.249***	−0.245***	−0.204**	−0.207***
	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Post-Jan 6	0.164*	0.239***	0.173**	0.107*	0.088*	0.091*	0.084*	0.073*	0.044	0.019	0.008	−0.001
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.029)
U.S. Target ×	−0.622**	−0.523**	−0.194	−0.010	0.110	0.105	0.137	0.166	0.159	0.190*	0.129	0.124
Post-Jan 6	(0.201)	(0.192)	(0.161)	(0.139)	(0.131)	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.087)
Contiguity Type	0.015	0.027*	0.023*	0.027**	0.020*	0.023**	0.019*	0.024**	0.026***	0.024***	0.021**	0.019**
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Bilateral Trade	0.007	0.009	0.004	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001	0.0002	0.00001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Polity	−0.0001	−0.001	−0.0003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.005	−0.006*	−0.006*	−0.007**	−0.005*	−0.006*	−0.005*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Initiator Polity	−0.009	−0.006	−0.010*	−0.006	−0.007+	−0.008*	−0.006*	−0.007*	−0.006*	−0.007**	−0.007**	−0.007**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Constant	−0.217*	−0.289**	−0.178*	−0.028	0.030	0.017	0.054	0.012	0.034	0.027	0.018	0.028
	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.045)
Observations	540	1,080	1,620	2,160	2,700	3,240	3,780	4,320	4,860	5,400	5,940	6,480
R^2	0.036	0.037	0.024	0.019	0.016	0.014	0.011	0.010	0.009	0.007	0.006	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.023	0.031	0.020	0.016	0.013	0.012	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.005

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 10: OLS Model Results: U.S. Protégés vs. Other Target

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. Protégés	0.024	−0.090	−0.194^{+}	−0.161^{+}	−0.125	−0.081	−0.077	−0.104	−0.069	−0.044	0.004	0.006
	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.060)
Post-Jan 6	0.162**	0.214**	0.145*	0.082^{+}	0.072	0.077^{+}	0.073^{+}	0.057	0.034	0.014	0.008	−0.002
	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.030)
U.S. Protégés ×	0.014	0.173	0.195	0.169	0.113	0.092	0.077	0.108	0.065	0.033	−0.004	0.007
Post-Jan 6	(0.163)	(0.173)	(0.148)	(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.114)	(0.103)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.080)
Contiguity Type	0.021^{+}	0.034*	0.026*	0.029**	0.021*	0.025**	0.021**	0.025***	0.027***	0.024***	0.021**	0.019**
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Bilateral Trade	0.004	0.005	−0.0002	−0.006	−0.006	−0.006^{+}	−0.007*	−0.006^{+}	−0.006^{+}	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Polity	0.0003	−0.0001	0.002	−0.0005	−0.001	−0.003	−0.005	−0.005^{+}	−0.006*	−0.004^{+}	−0.005*	−0.005*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Initiator Polity	−0.014**	−0.013*	−0.015**	−0.010*	−0.011**	−0.012**	−0.009**	−0.010**	−0.008**	−0.009**	−0.009**	−0.008**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	−0.204*	−0.260**	−0.126	0.007	0.078	0.051	0.088	0.057	0.073	0.069	0.053	0.065
	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.046)
Observations	480	960	1,440	1,920	2,400	2,880	3,360	3,840	4,320	4,800	5,280	5,760
R^2	0.038	0.029	0.019	0.012	0.008	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.004
Adjusted R^2	0.023	0.022	0.014	0.008	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.003

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.01

II-D. Heckman Models

In the paper, we discuss alternative approaches to handling directed-dyad days in which no interaction within the dyad occurs. Our main models in the paper are simple OLS models with a restricted sample of directed-dyads that experienced at least one event in the previous month. This appendix reports results from Heckman correction models with the full sample of directed-dyads. In the first stage, we model the probability of experiencing any event between a directed-dyad in a probit model. In the second stage, we model the intensity of the event using OLS (second stage).

Table 11: Heckman Model Results: U.S. Target vs Other Target

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Probit Selection Outcome												
U.S. Target	1.726***	1.376***	1.336***	1.271***	1.239***	1.201***	1.212***	1.143***	1.142***	1.074***	1.035***	1.016***
	(0.243)	(0.169)	(0.137)	(0.120)	(0.108)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.071)
Post-Jan 6	−0.031	−0.009	−0.174*	−0.192**	−0.118*	−0.096*	−0.064	−0.083*	−0.053	−0.061+	−0.042	−0.038
	(0.144)	(0.088)	(0.074)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.034)
U.S. Target ×	−0.259	0.112	−0.006	0.013	0.038	0.055	0.030	0.081	0.043	0.122	0.178+	0.185+
Post-Jan 6	(0.329)	(0.226)	(0.190)	(0.167)	(0.148)	(0.133)	(0.123)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.095)
Contiguity Type	−0.047	−0.069***	−0.073***	−0.080***	−0.091***	−0.080***	−0.078***	−0.074***	−0.072***	−0.066***	−0.064***	−0.063***
	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Bilateral Trade	0.020+	0.016*	0.020**	0.014**	0.015**	0.017***	0.019***	0.021***	0.022***	0.023***	0.024***	0.025***
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Polity	−0.008	−0.005	−0.001	−0.001	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Initiator Polity	−0.037**	−0.019*	−0.013*	−0.008	−0.011*	−0.009*	−0.007+	−0.009*	−0.008*	−0.009**	−0.008*	−0.008**
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	−2.126***	−1.768***	−1.750***	−1.632***	−1.588***	−1.615***	−1.643***	−1.683***	−1.709***	−1.739***	−1.763***	−1.797***
	(0.214)	(0.144)	(0.115)	(0.097)	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.055)
OLS Outcome												
U.S. Target	0.322	−0.648	−1.010	−0.478	−1.277+	−1.208+	−1.080+	−1.082+	−0.901+	−1.243*	−1.326**	−1.377**
	(1.890)	(1.278)	(1.042)	(0.843)	(0.707)	(0.645)	(0.596)	(0.578)	(0.529)	(0.504)	(0.492)	(0.480)
Post-Jan 6	2.298**	1.854***	1.725***	0.929*	0.361	0.323	0.207	0.184	−0.033	−0.170	−0.271	−0.397+
	(0.731)	(0.511)	(0.480)	(0.441)	(0.358)	(0.313)	(0.279)	(0.272)	(0.250)	(0.236)	(0.227)	(0.223)
US Target ×	−3.191**	−2.223*	−1.746*	−0.780	0.238	0.318	0.437	0.547	0.644	0.807+	0.703	0.814+
Post-Jan 6	(1.172)	(0.906)	(0.824)	(0.795)	(0.691)	(0.613)	(0.547)	(0.537)	(0.499)	(0.472)	(0.461)	(0.453)
Constant	−0.063	0.310	0.365	−1.620	−0.654	−0.353	−0.191	−0.081	−0.363	0.412	0.782	0.758
	(3.028)	(2.361)	(1.894)	(1.486)	(1.235)	(1.141)	(1.051)	(1.048)	(0.933)	(0.926)	(0.921)	(0.909)
Observations	1,580	3,160	4,740	6,320	7,900	9,480	11,060	12,640	14,220	15,800	17,380	18,960

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 11 show results from these Heckman models with twelve different time windows. It demonstrates that January 6th riots did not make U.S. rivals significantly more or less likely to take actions towards the United States relative to other states (the interaction term is insignificant in the selection part of the models), but they did cause the actions taken by U.S. rivals against the United States to become more negative−−that is, more conflictual or hostile−−in the the 5-day, 10-day, and 15-day windows relative to their actions towards others. This pattern is very similar to the OLS models reported in the main text. Figure 6 illustrates these findings graphically.



Figure 6: Difference-in-Difference Effect using Heckman Correction Models

II-E. Robustness Checks

We conduct a series of robustness checks with different model specifications, alternative dependent variables, and different ways to construct the comparison groups. The robustness checks are as follows:

- First, we consider different standard errors. Table 12 reports OLS models that treat "U.S. Rivals–U.S." directed dyads as the treatment group and "U.S. Rivals–Other States" directed dyads as the control group, with standard errors clustered by directed-dyad.
- Second, we replicate the analysis with a two-period DiD design. Table 13 reports OLS models that treat "U.S. Rivals–U.S." directed dyads as the treatment group and "U.S. Rivals–Other States" directed dyads as the control group, but with daily observations aggregated into two periods (pre vs. post January 6th).
- Third, we consider an alternative way to measure the dependent variable. In our main analysis, the dependent variable is the daily average of intensity scores, which includes both hostile and non-hostile interactions. Table 14 reports OLS models that treat "U.S. Rivals–U.S." directed dyads as the treatment group and "U.S. Rivals–other States" directed dyads as the control group, but with the dependent variable as the daily average of intensity scores of only *hostile* interactions.
- Fourth, we consider an alternative coding of U.S. protégés. Table 15 reports OLS models that treat "U.S. Rivals–Non-U.S. Democratic Rivals" as the treatment group and "U.S. Rivals–other States" as the control group. Specifically, we first drop the U.S. from our sample, and then code a directed-dyad as a 1 (indicating "treated") if the target state is the U.S. rival's own democratic rival, and 0 otherwise. The results are similar to those reported in Table 10, further suggesting that the short-lived increase in hostility from U.S. rivals was targeted towards the U.S. rather than U.S. protégés.
- Fifth, we address concerns that our finding might be driven by the unique sample we use, which relies on Peace Data's identification of dyads with meaningful interactions. We run an additional robustness check of our initial model on a different sample. The different sample uses the set of "politically relevant dyads" as commonly defined in the international relations literature. This sample includes the same eight U.S. rivals on the initiator side and major powers and their land contiguous neighbours on the target side. Results from these models are reported in Table 16, which are similar to those in the main text.
- Sixth, we consider an alternative design of the comparison groups in the DiD framework. Table 17 reports OLS models that treat "U.S. Rivals–U.S." as the treatment group and "Non-Rivals–U.S." as the control group. Results from these models are similar to those we reported in our main tests. U.S. rivals were indeed slightly more hostile towards the U.S. shortly after Jan 6, not only when compared to their behaviors toward other countries but also compared to other countries' behaviors toward the U.S.
- Seventh, another concern is that the short-term hostility we observe after January 6th in the main analyses is not unique to U.S. rivals. If, for example, we find that U.S. allies also used

more critical rhetoric after January 6th, this would suggest that a broader set of countries mocked and criticized the U.S. To address this concern, we replicate our core analyses using a group of U.S. allies rather than U.S. rivals. We proxy U.S. allies as NATO member countries. In the analyses, the "treated" dyads are "NATO Members – U.S." and the comparison dyads are "NATO Members – Other Countries." Results from these models are reported in Table 18, which show no evidence for an increase in short-term hostility. This suggests that the criticism and mocking that we observe in the main analysis was specific to U.S. rival governments.

Table 12: OLS Models with SEs Clustered on Directed-Dyads: U.S. Target vs. Other Target

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. Target	0.114	−0.167	−0.301*	−0.369**	−0.416***	−0.347***	−0.286***	−0.265**	−0.249**	−0.245**	−0.204**	−0.207**
	(0.191)	(0.152)	(0.128)	(0.114)	(0.099)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Post-Jan 6	0.164**	0.239***	0.173***	0.107*	0.088*	0.091*	0.084*	0.073*	0.044	0.019	0.008	−0.001
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.028)
U.S. Target ×	−0.622+	−0.523*	−0.194	−0.010	0.110	0.105	0.137	0.166	0.159	0.190+	0.129	0.124
Post-Jan 6	(0.337)	(0.245)	(0.183)	(0.153)	(0.141)	(0.128)	(0.124)	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Contiguity Type	0.015	0.027+	0.023+	0.027**	0.020*	0.023*	0.019*	0.024**	0.026***	0.024***	0.021**	0.019**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Bilateral Trade	0.007*	0.009	0.004	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001	0.0002	0.00001
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Polity	−0.0001	−0.001	−0.0003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.005*	−0.006**	−0.006**	−0.007**	−0.005**	−0.006**	−0.005**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Initiator Polity	−0.009	−0.006	−0.010*	−0.006	−0.007+	−0.008*	−0.006+	−0.007*	−0.006*	−0.007**	−0.007**	−0.007**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	−0.217*	−0.289*	−0.178+	−0.028	0.030	0.017	0.054	0.012	0.034	0.027	0.018	0.028
	(0.091)	(0.126)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.046)
Observations	540	1,080	1,620	2,160	2,700	3,240	3,780	4,320	4,860	5,400	5,940	6,480
R^2	0.036	0.037	0.024	0.019	0.016	0.014	0.011	0.010	0.009	0.007	0.006	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.023	0.031	0.020	0.016	0.013	0.012	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.005

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.01

Table 13: OLS Models with Two-Period DiD Design: U.S. Target vs. Other Target

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. Target	0.114	−0.167	−0.301^{+}	−0.369*	−0.416*	−0.347*	−0.286^{+}	−0.265^{+}	−0.249	−0.245	−0.204	−0.207
	(0.174)	(0.226)	(0.181)	(0.149)	(0.160)	(0.162)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.152)	(0.155)	(0.146)
Post-Jan 6	0.164*	0.239*	0.173*	0.107	0.088	0.091	0.084	0.073	0.044	0.019	0.008	−0.001
	(0.080)	(0.104)	(0.083)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.067)
U.S. Target ×	−0.622*	−0.523^{+}	−0.194	−0.010	0.110	0.105	0.137	0.166	0.159	0.190	0.129	0.124
Post-Jan 6	(0.240)	(0.312)	(0.250)	(0.205)	(0.221)	(0.223)	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.213)	(0.209)	(0.213)	(0.202)
Contiguity Type	0.015	0.027	0.023	0.027^{+}	0.020	0.023	0.019	0.024	0.026^{+}	0.024	0.021	0.019
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Bilateral Trade	0.007	0.009	0.004	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001	0.0002	0.00001
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Target Polity	−0.0001	−0.001	−0.0003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.005	−0.006	−0.006	−0.007	−0.005	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Initiator Polity	−0.009	−0.006	−0.010	−0.006	−0.007	−0.008	−0.006	−0.007	−0.006	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	−0.217^{+}	−0.289^{+}	−0.178	−0.028	0.030	0.017	0.054	0.012	0.034	0.027	0.018	0.028
	(0.126)	(0.163)	(0.131)	(0.107)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.106)
Observations	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
R^2	0.121	0.135	0.141	0.160	0.135	0.118	0.111	0.106	0.090	0.076	0.063	0.064
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.074	0.081	0.102	0.074	0.057	0.049	0.043	0.026	0.011	-0.003	-0.001

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.01

Table 14: OLS Models with Intensity Scores of Only Hostile Interactions as DV: U.S. Target vs. Other Target

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. Target	−0.513***	−0.445***	−0.539***	−0.578***	−0.602***	−0.544***	−0.505***	−0.459***	−0.455***	−0.401***	−0.360***	−0.358***
	(0.143)	(0.132)	(0.103)	(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.051)
Post-Jan 6	0.033	0.107^{+}	0.121*	0.062	0.038	0.051	0.050^{+}	0.058*	0.035	0.037	0.031	0.025
	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)
U.S. Target ×	−0.320	−0.371*	−0.057	0.084	0.145	0.070	0.021	−0.002	0.042	0.005	−0.037	−0.047
Post-Jan 6	(0.197)	(0.182)	(0.143)	(0.122)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.070)
Contiguity Type	0.007	0.015	0.020*	0.025**	0.025***	0.024***	0.021***	0.026***	0.031***	0.027***	0.024***	0.023***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Bilateral Trade	−0.002	0.011*	0.006	0.001	0.0003	0.0001	−0.001	−0.002	−0.004	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Target Polity	−0.001	−0.003	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.003	−0.004*	−0.005*	−0.005*	−0.005**	−0.005**
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Initiator Polity	0.003	−0.002	−0.005	−0.004	−0.004	−0.005^{+}	−0.004	−0.005^{+}	−0.004^{+}	−0.004^{+}	−0.005*	−0.004*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	−0.028	−0.346***	−0.296***	−0.213***	−0.187***	−0.200***	−0.171***	−0.184***	−0.169***	−0.173***	−0.179***	−0.162***
	(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.037)
Observations	540	1,080	1,620	2,160	2,700	3,240	3,780	4,320	4,860	5,400	5,940	6,480
R^2	0.085	0.051	0.045	0.039	0.040	0.035	0.035	0.031	0.028	0.024	0.022	0.022
Adjusted R^2	0.073	0.045	0.041	0.036	0.037	0.033	0.033	0.029	0.027	0.023	0.020	0.021

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.01

Table 15: OLS Models: Democratic Rival Target vs. Other Target

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Democratic Rivals	0.085	−0.004	−0.148	−0.138	−0.125	−0.078	−0.079	−0.155*	−0.131*	−0.114+	−0.101+	−0.095+
	(0.111)	(0.118)	(0.101)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.054)
Post-Jan 6	0.170**	0.232***	0.150**	0.083	0.072	0.093*	0.086*	0.057	0.034	0.012	−0.002	−0.013
	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Democratic Rivals ×	−0.034	0.035	0.125	0.126	0.087	−0.011	−0.013	0.082	0.054	0.038	0.052	0.061
Post-Jan 6	(0.147)	(0.157)	(0.134)	(0.117)	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.072)
Contiguity Type	0.023+	0.034*	0.024*	0.027**	0.019+	0.023**	0.019*	0.022**	0.024**	0.021**	0.019**	0.016**
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Bilateral Trade	0.004	0.005	−0.0002	−0.006	−0.006	−0.007+	−0.007*	−0.007*	−0.007*	−0.005+	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Polity	−0.001	−0.001	0.003	−0.0002	−0.0005	−0.002	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.002	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Initiator Polity	−0.014**	−0.013*	−0.014**	−0.009*	−0.010*	−0.011**	−0.008**	−0.009**	−0.008**	−0.009**	−0.009**	−0.008**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Constant	−0.227*	−0.276**	−0.118	0.017	0.093	0.067	0.104+	0.088	0.104+	0.100+	0.087+	0.096*
	(0.098)	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Observations	480	960	1,440	1,920	2,400	2,880	3,360	3,840	4,320	4,800	5,280	5,760
R^2	0.039	0.028	0.018	0.011	0.008	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.007	0.006	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.021	0.013	0.008	0.005	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.005	0.004	0.004

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.01

Table 16: OLS Model Results: U.S. Target vs. Other Target (Politically Relevant Dyad)

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. Target	0.252	−0.021	−0.177	−0.241*	−0.287**	−0.232*	−0.198*	−0.188*	−0.193*	−0.200**	−0.172*	−0.173*
	(0.175)	(0.157)	(0.132)	(0.113)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.070)
Post-Jan 6	0.169+	0.248**	0.167*	0.126*	0.084	0.062	0.040	0.020	−0.027	−0.063	−0.062	−0.064+
	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.038)
U.S. Target ×	−0.627**	−0.533*	−0.188	−0.029	0.114	0.134	0.181	0.219+	0.229*	0.272**	0.199*	0.186+
Post-Jan 6	(0.238)	(0.214)	(0.179)	(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.137)	(0.124)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.095)
Contiguity Type	−0.011	0.015	0.007	0.013	0.007	0.012	0.010	0.012	0.019+	0.016	0.018+	0.016+
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Bilateral Trade	0.004	0.004	0.0005	−0.005	−0.006	−0.005	−0.005	−0.001	−0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Target Polity	−0.005	−0.013+	−0.009	−0.011*	−0.015**	−0.017***	−0.017***	−0.016***	−0.017***	−0.014***	−0.015***	−0.013***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Initiator Polity	−0.003	0.003	−0.005	−0.002	−0.004	−0.006	−0.006	−0.010*	−0.009*	−0.011**	−0.010**	−0.010**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Constant	−0.126	−0.176	−0.095	0.011	0.109	0.079	0.112	0.033	0.054	0.040	0.030	0.022
	(0.157)	(0.141)	(0.118)	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Observations	370	740	1,110	1,480	1,850	2,220	2,590	2,960	3,330	3,700	4,070	4,440
R^2	0.026	0.031	0.018	0.016	0.018	0.016	0.014	0.013	0.012	0.011	0.011	0.010
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.021	0.011	0.012	0.014	0.013	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.009

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 17: OLS Models: U.S. Rivals–U.S. vs. Non-Rivals–U.S

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. Rival Initiator	0.119	−0.124	−0.211*	−0.253***	−0.280***	−0.242***	−0.202**	−0.174**	−0.133*	−0.104+	−0.072	−0.097+
	(0.150)	(0.112)	(0.091)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Post-Jan 6	0.061	0.062	0.047	0.055	0.077*	0.072*	0.091**	0.094**	0.108***	0.124***	0.113***	0.085**
	(0.078)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
U.S. Rival Initiator ×	−0.519**	−0.347*	−0.068	0.042	0.121	0.124	0.129	0.145+	0.094	0.085	0.024	0.037
Post-Jan 6	(0.189)	(0.141)	(0.115)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Contiguity Type	−0.036	−0.007	0.018	0.022	0.014	0.011	0.019	0.028+	0.033*	0.043**	0.034*	0.033*
	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Bilateral Trade	0.020	0.029**	0.025**	0.018*	0.027***	0.028***	0.028***	0.031***	0.032***	0.036***	0.035***	0.036***
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Initiator Polity	−0.001	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.002	−0.0002	−0.0003	−0.0002	−0.001	0.0005	−0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	−0.269	−0.623*	−0.686**	−0.533*	−0.689***	−0.669***	−0.716***	−0.836***	−0.879***	−1.011***	−0.946***	−0.927***
	(0.417)	(0.311)	(0.253)	(0.212)	(0.201)	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.174)	(0.170)	(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.160)
Observations	350	700	1,050	1,400	1,750	2,100	2,450	2,800	3,150	3,500	3,850	4,200
R^2	0.040	0.058	0.045	0.040	0.040	0.033	0.026	0.026	0.024	0.025	0.021	0.019
Adjusted R^2	0.023	0.050	0.039	0.036	0.036	0.030	0.023	0.024	0.022	0.023	0.019	0.018

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.01

Table 18: OLS Models: NATO Members–U.S. vs. NATO Members–Others

	5-Day	10-Day	15-Day	20-Day	25-Day	30-Day	35-Day	40-Day	45-Day	50-Day	55-Day	60-Day
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. Target	0.061	0.028	0.032	0.027	0.018	0.007	0.015	0.012	0.009	0.002	0.027	0.028
	(0.107)	(0.073)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Post-Jan 6	0.109*	0.068*	0.063**	0.052*	0.051**	0.047**	0.035*	0.026+	0.029*	0.030*	0.033**	0.026*
	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
U.S. Target ×	−0.162	−0.005	0.037	0.023	0.047	0.043	0.052	0.050	0.086*	0.079*	0.056	0.049
Post-Jan 6	(0.143)	(0.098)	(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Contiguity Type	−0.011	−0.011	−0.010+	−0.009+	−0.008+	−0.004	−0.003	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Bilateral Trade	−0.002	0.001	0.001	−0.0002	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Polity	0.012*	0.012***	0.010***	0.014***	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***	0.007***	0.005***	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Initiator Polity	0.004	0.008+	0.008*	0.012***	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.006***	0.005**	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	−0.090	−0.142	−0.135	−0.187*	−0.143+	−0.153*	−0.171**	−0.150**	−0.146**	−0.133**	−0.148**	−0.140**
	(0.185)	(0.127)	(0.099)	(0.087)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Observations	800	1,600	2,400	3,200	4,000	4,800	5,600	6,400	7,200	8,000	8,800	9,600
R^2	0.016	0.015	0.014	0.021	0.013	0.012	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.006	0.007	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.010	0.011	0.019	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.008	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.005

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.01

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