Appendix A: Summary Statistics and Additional Results

Summary statistics

Table A1 provides the summary statistics of all variables used in the main empirical tests reported in the paper.

Table A1 Summary Statistics of Variables

| Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
MID Initiation	3,696	0.040	0.196	0	1
Target Tenure (logged)	3,696	6.556	1.199	0.693	9.036
DPC-General	3,696	0.921	0.861	0	2
DPC-FP	3,696	0.900	0.847	0	2
Challenger Tenure (logged)	3,696	7.342	1.429	0.000	9.795
Challenger Age	3,696	60.613	11.626	19	94
Target Age	3,696	62.772	9.051	31	87
Challenger Gender	3,696	0.996	0.064	0	1
Target Gender	3,696	0.956	0.204	0	1
Previous Experience	3,696	0.253	0.435	0	1
Pre-election MIDs (5-year)	3,696	9.133	6.637	0	26
Relative Power	3,696	0.354	0.333	0.0002	1.000
Joint Democracy	3,696	0.152	0.359	0	1
Bilateral Trade (logged)	3,696	12.644	7.628	0.000	24.907
Distance	3,696	4.185	2.190	1	6
Cold War	3,696	0.700	0.458	0	1
Peace Year	3,696	13.201	12.279	0	68

Descriptive statistics

Some brief descriptive analyses can help clarify the distribution of as well as the association between the dependent variable and two key independent variables in the raw data. These quantity of interests are graphically presented in Figure A1.

Panel A in Figure A1 shows the distribution of MIDs by the targeted leaders' type. There is a total of 148 MIDs, with No Party Change type being challenged 61 times, Right to Left type 45 times, and Left to Right type 42 times. Panel B plots the distribution of all 242 leaders on the target side in the sample by their types, in which about 47% are No Party Change type, 24% are Right to Left type, and about 29% are Left to Right type. Combining these two figures together, we can clearly see that the higher frequency of being challenged for the No Party Change type (which is shown in Panel A) is partly a result that more leaders on the target side in the sample belong to this type.

Panel C plots the portion of each type of leaders who get challenged at least one time. There are about 27% of the No Party Change type that get at least one militarized challenge during their stay in office, while 39% of Right to Left type and 32% percent of Left to Right type had been challenged, suggesting that leaders who are more left-leaning than their predecessor are slightly more likely to be targeted than the other two types. However, the key focus of this paper is not whether one type of leaders is more or less trouble-attractive, but the timing of the challenge. Panel D plots the ratio of the average time it takes for leaders to face their first militarized challenge to the average length of their tenure by three types of targeted leaders. This

Figure A1: Challenge and the Timing of Challenge

Panel A: Distribution of MIDs by target type

Panel B: Distribution of leader types

Panel C: Portions of each type of leaders who are challenged at least once

Panel D: Timing of MIDs by target type

comparison reveals that among the targeted leaders, the Left to Right types on average tend to meet their first militarized challenge before they complete one-half of their tenure, which is sooner than the other two types.

Taken together, these plots demonstrate three features of the Left to Right type leaders in the sample: on average, they are not more likely to appear in the sample, nor are they more likely to be challenged generally, but they do tend to face challenges sooner after taking office than the other two types should they be targeted.

Models with different fixed effects

Table A2: Models with different fixed effects

	No FE		Challenger State FE		Challenger State & Target State FE	
	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)	(A6)
Target Tenure	0.118	0.124	0.149	0.154	0.102	0.108
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.113)
DPC						
DPC-General=1 (Right to Left)	0.452		0.775		1.159	
	(1.026)		(1.064)		(1.191)	
DPC-General=2 (Left to Right)	2.739**		2.815**		3.805***	
	(0.927)		(0.937)		(1.017)	
DPC-FP=1 (Right to Left)		0.588		0.976		1.318
		(1.038)		(1.073)		(1.181)
DPC-FP=2 (Left to Right)		2.546**		2.571**		3.791***
		(0.920)		(0.944)		(1.042)
Interaction Terms						
DPC-General=1 × Target Tenure	−0.004		−0.061		−0.107	
	(0.156)		(0.160)		(0.180)	
DPC-General=2 × Target Tenure	−0.417**		−0.436**		−0.576***	
	(0.143)		(0.144)		(0.156)	
DPC-FP=1 × Target Tenure		−0.039		−0.101		−0.137
		(0.159)		(0.162)		(0.178)
DPC-FP=2 × Target Tenure		−0.376**		−0.391**		−0.568***
		(0.142)		(0.144)		(0.160)
Controls						
Challenger Tenure	0.018	0.020	−0.012	−0.013	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Challenger Age	−0.007	−0.008	−0.013	−0.013	−0.018	−0.018
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Target Age	0.019[+]	0.015	0.020	0.016	0.036**	0.033*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Challenger Gender	−0.901	−0.930	−0.836	−0.835	−0.770	−0.774
	(0.611)	(0.611)	(0.542)	(0.552)	(0.510)	(0.521)
Target Gender	−0.573	−0.539	−0.578	−0.544	−0.859[+]	−0.838[+]
	(0.365)	(0.364)	(0.381)	(0.383)	(0.439)	(0.440)
Previous Experience	−0.222	−0.215	−0.170	−0.169	−0.229	−0.229
	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.242)	(0.242)
Pre-Turnover MIDs (5-year)	0.046**	0.046**	0.048*	0.047*	0.026	0.027
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Relative Power	0.983**	0.998**	0.128	0.133	0.927	0.866
	(0.305)	(0.309)	(0.741)	(0.747)	(1.476)	(1.489)
Joint Democracy	−0.241	−0.197	0.278	0.296	0.266	0.289
	(0.273)	(0.271)	(0.416)	(0.418)	(0.455)	(0.455)
Bilateral Trade	0.038**	0.039**	0.006	0.007	0.008	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Distance	−0.141**	−0.148***	−0.325***	−0.328***	−0.347***	−0.349***
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Coldwar	−0.264	−0.241	−0.234	−0.218	0.076	0.129
	(0.215)	(0.219)	(0.227)	(0.229)	(0.247)	(0.249)
Peace Year	−0.111**	−0.108*	−0.092[+]	−0.089[+]	−0.050	−0.047
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Peace Year^2	0.004	0.004	0.004[+]	0.004[+]	0.003	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Peace Year^3	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000[+]	−0.000[+]	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	−3.428**	−3.234*	−1.296	−1.167	−1.489	−1.414
	(1.302)	(1.289)	(1.467)	(1.464)	(1.587)	(1.601)
Observations	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696
Log Likelihood	-575.769	-577.573	-532.468	-533.931	-505.360	-506.120

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on directed-leader-dyads are in parentheses. [+]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Models with uncleaned MID as DV

Table A3: Logit models with uncleaned MID initiation as DV

	(A7)	(A8)	(A9)	(A10)
Target Tenure	0.055	0.068	0.059	0.072
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.080)
DPC				
DPC-General=1 (Right to Left)	0.212	0.362		
	(0.881)	(0.895)		
DPC-General=2 (Left to Right)	2.053*	2.204*		
	(0.837)	(0.860)		
DPC-FP=1 (Right to Left)			0.352	0.488
			(0.922)	(0.933)
DPC-FP=2 (Left to Right)			1.892*	2.084*
			(0.832)	(0.854)
Interaction Terms				
DPC-General=1 × Target Tenure	0.031	0.014		
	(0.131)	(0.133)		
DPC-General=2 × Target Tenure	−0.302*	−0.319*		
	(0.126)	(0.129)		
DPC-FP=1 × Target Tenure			−0.002	−0.011
			(0.137)	(0.139)
DPC-FP=2 × Target Tenure			−0.270*	−0.295*
			(0.124)	(0.128)
Controls				
Challenger Tenure	−0.073	−0.062	−0.072	−0.061
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Challenger Age	0.012*	0.005	0.012[+]	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Target Age	0.012	0.012	0.009	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Challenger Gender	−1.193	−1.144	−1.183	−1.135
	(0.739)	(0.732)	(0.741)	(0.733)
Target Gender	−0.474	−0.427	−0.433	−0.395
	(0.306)	(0.309)	(0.305)	(0.309)
Previous Experience	−0.321[+]	−0.323[+]	−0.312[+]	−0.321[+]
	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.182)	(0.185)
Pre-election MIDs (5-year)	0.015	0.014	0.016	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Relative Power		1.254***		1.268***
		(0.346)		(0.347)
Joint Democracy		0.230		0.250
		(0.222)		(0.222)
Bilateral Trade		−0.004		−0.004
		(0.016)		(0.016)
Distance		−0.283***		−0.285***
		(0.053)		(0.053)
Coldwar		0.236		0.264[+]
		(0.157)		(0.156)
Peace Year	−0.172***	−0.143**	−0.170***	−0.140**
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Peace Year^2	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Peace Year^3	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	−1.585	−0.266	−1.490	−0.227
	(1.178)	(1.246)	(1.175)	(1.244)
Observations	3,706	3,706	3,706	3,706
Log Likelihood	-912.109	-887.472	-914.219	-888.949

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on directed-leader-dyads are in parentheses. Target state fixed effects are included in all models.[+]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix B: Robustness Checks

Table B1: Robustness checks with additional controls and different samples (DPC-General)

	Additional Control	First Year	First-three Year	Left Truncated	Long-time Rivalry
	(B1)	(B2)	(B3)	(B4)	(B5)
Target Tenure	0.118		0.175	0.119	−0.031
	(0.131)		(0.138)	(0.114)	(0.113)
DPC					
DPC-General=1 (Right to Left)	0.501	0.360	0.747	1.135	0.854
	(1.488)	(0.490)	(1.685)	(1.197)	(1.423)
DPC-General=2 (Left to Right)	4.480**	0.880*	4.013**	3.972***	3.471**
	(1.632)	(0.447)	(1.312)	(1.045)	(1.123)
Interaction Terms					
DPC-General=1 × Target Tenure	−0.022		−0.044	−0.121	0.002
	(0.222)		(0.276)	(0.182)	(0.216)
DPC-General=2 × Target Tenure	−0.661**		−0.622**	−0.613***	−0.502**
	(0.252)		(0.224)	(0.164)	(0.173)
Controls					
Challenger Tenure	−0.058	−0.218	−0.066	−0.028	0.003
	(0.088)	(0.156)	(0.089)	(0.076)	(0.087)
Challenger Age	−0.007	0.028	0.012	−0.009	−0.015
	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Target Age	0.035*	0.054*	0.042**	0.034**	0.051***
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Challenger Gender	−1.292*	−0.275	−1.627*	−0.823	−0.758
	(0.614)	(0.980)	(0.777)	(0.626)	(0.954)
Target Gender	−0.270	−1.443+	−1.189**	−0.815+	−1.230**
	(0.568)	(0.816)	(0.444)	(0.418)	(0.459)
Previous Experience	0.005	−0.555	−0.446	−0.153	−0.367
	(0.325)	(0.491)	(0.314)	(0.248)	(0.266)
Pre-Turnover MIDs (5-year)	0.009	0.017	0.012	0.003	0.042+
	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Relative Power	0.275	1.321	1.515*	1.428**	2.202***
	(0.641)	(1.217)	(0.598)	(0.523)	(0.605)
Joint Democracy	−0.133	−0.303	0.084	0.111	0.422
	(0.387)	(0.551)	(0.406)	(0.339)	(0.392)
Bilateral Trade	−0.024	−0.001	−0.019	−0.010	−0.005
	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Distance	−0.399***	−0.469**	−0.315***	−0.285***	−0.206**
	(0.118)	(0.148)	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.075)
Cold War	−0.197	−1.039**	−0.145	−0.305	−0.384
	(0.312)	(0.399)	(0.250)	(0.214)	(0.236)
Target GDP Growth	−0.025				
	(0.033)				
Predecessor Tenure	−0.232**				
	(0.088)				
Predecessor FP Failure	0.112				
	(0.197)				
Ongoing Interstate War	−0.338				
	(0.459)				
Ongoing Intrastate War	0.059				
	(0.832)				
Peace Year	−0.080	−0.068	−0.079	−0.072	−0.143**
	(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.053)
Peace Year^2	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Peace Year^3	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000+
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.852	−2.086	−1.886	−1.408	−2.201
	(2.048)	(2.434)	(2.045)	(1.537)	(1.904)
Observations	2,494	943	2,156	3,602	2,727
Log Likelihood	-378.808	-124.670	-333.955	-538.929	-388.264

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on directed-leader-dyads are in parentheses. Target state fixed effects are included in all models.$^+$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table B2: Robustness checks with different samples (DPC-FP)

	Additional Control	First Year	First-three Year	Left Truncated	Long-time Rivalry
	(B6)	(B7)	(B8)	(B9)	(B10)
Target Tenure	0.127		0.178	0.123	−0.032
	(0.134)		(0.138)	(0.113)	(0.113)
DPC					
DPC-FP=1 (Right to Left)	0.258	0.077	0.519	1.352	0.923
	(1.467)	(0.478)	(1.629)	(1.209)	(1.342)
DPC-FP=2 (Left to Right)	5.328**	1.162*	4.334***	3.853***	3.591**
	(1.691)	(0.464)	(1.314)	(1.068)	(1.190)
Interaction Terms					
DPC-FP=1 × Target Tenure	−0.005		−0.005	−0.158	−0.014
	(0.217)		(0.265)	(0.183)	(0.203)
DPC-FP=2 × Target Tenure	−0.759**		−0.677**	−0.589***	−0.524**
	(0.262)		(0.224)	(0.167)	(0.183)
Controls					
Challenger Tenure	−0.061	−0.221	−0.062	−0.024	0.006
	(0.087)	(0.154)	(0.088)	(0.076)	(0.087)
Challenger Age	−0.009	0.029	0.012	−0.009	−0.015
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Target Age	0.031*	0.053*	0.040**	0.031*	0.048***
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Challenger Gender	−1.332*	−0.384	−1.656*	−0.810	−0.788
	(0.618)	(1.044)	(0.774)	(0.631)	(0.944)
Target Gender	−0.142	−1.393+	−1.188**	−0.788+	−1.241**
	(0.589)	(0.811)	(0.442)	(0.418)	(0.460)
Previous Experience	0.097	−0.522	−0.478	−0.158	−0.373
	(0.320)	(0.480)	(0.318)	(0.250)	(0.265)
Pre-Turnover MIDs (5-year)	0.006	0.018	0.014	0.006	0.044+
	(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Relative Power	0.275	1.219	1.515*	1.426**	2.201***
	(0.633)	(1.209)	(0.600)	(0.524)	(0.608)
Joint Democracy	−0.152	−0.324	0.099	0.126	0.416
	(0.393)	(0.535)	(0.406)	(0.338)	(0.389)
Bilateral Trade	−0.024	0.004	−0.019	−0.009	−0.003
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Distance	−0.402***	−0.482**	−0.316***	−0.287***	−0.205**
	(0.118)	(0.154)	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Cold War	−0.138	−1.044**	−0.081	−0.262	−0.317
	(0.314)	(0.409)	(0.249)	(0.213)	(0.234)
Target GDP Growth	−0.029				
	(0.032)				
Predecessor Tenure	−0.251**				
	(0.088)				
Predecessor FP Failure	0.064				
	(0.198)				
Ongoing Interstate War	−0.386				
	(0.467)				
Ongoing Intrastate War	0.256				
	(0.793)				
Peace Year	−0.081	−0.044	−0.078	−0.070	−0.142**
	(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.053)
Peace Year^2	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Peace Year^3	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000+
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.237	−2.224	−1.894	−1.374	−2.031
	(2.077)	(2.375)	(2.027)	(1.542)	(1.866)
Observations	2,494	943	2,156	3,602	2,727
Log Likelihood	-377.788	-123.073	-333.279	-539.938	-388.124

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on directed-leader-dyads are in parentheses. Target state fixed effects are included in all models. $^+$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table B3: Robustness check with three-way Interaction Models

	Head of Gov (B11)	Military (B12)	Political (B13)	Head of Gov (B14)	Military (B15)	Political (B16)
Target Tenure	0.071	0.079	0.028	0.068	0.079	0.025
	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.110)	(0.125)	(0.131)	(0.110)
DPC						
DPC-General=1 (Right to Left)	1.010	0.592	−0.218			
	(1.478)	(1.399)	(1.302)			
DPC-General=2 (Left to Right)	6.170***	4.046**	3.431**			
	(1.400)	(1.535)	(1.181)			
DPC-FP=1 (Right to Left)				0.991	0.191	0.070
				(1.472)	(1.443)	(1.315)
DPC-FP=2 (Left to Right)				6.378***	4.518**	3.310**
				(1.437)	(1.625)	(1.234)
Different Types of Previous Experience						
Previous Experience	−0.495	0.575	0.037	−0.601	0.554	0.036
	(1.565)	(1.291)	(0.053)	(1.579)	(1.288)	(0.053)
Interaction Terms						
DPC-General=1 × Target Tenure	−0.080	−0.012	0.111			
	(0.224)	(0.212)	(0.189)			
DPC-General=2 × Target Tenure	−0.925***	−0.557*	−0.465**			
	(0.220)	(0.242)	(0.177)			
Previous Experience × Target Tenure	0.050	−0.102	0.001	0.067	−0.100	0.001
	(0.231)	(0.200)	(0.009)	(0.232)	(0.200)	(0.009)
DPC-FP=1 × Target Tenure				−0.085	0.042	0.069
				(0.225)	(0.214)	(0.190)
DPC-FP=2 × Target Tenure				−0.944***	−0.608*	−0.443*
				(0.225)	(0.256)	(0.185)
DPC-General=1 × Previous Experience	−0.184	−1.691	0.025			
	(2.296)	(2.670)	(0.099)			
DPC-General=2 × Previous Experience	−5.445*	−1.238	0.006			
	(2.323)	(2.393)	(0.093)			
DPC-General=1 × Previous Experience × Target Tenure	0.039	0.214	−0.008			
	(0.349)	(0.386)	(0.016)			
DPC-General=2 × Previous Experience × Target Tenure	0.836*	0.139	−0.006			
	(0.354)	(0.366)	(0.015)			
DPC-FP=1 × Previous Experience				0.344	0.270	0.083
				(2.281)	(2.576)	(0.103)
DPC-FP=2 × Previous Experience				−5.851*	−2.409	−0.052
				(2.421)	(2.390)	(0.097)
DPC-FP=1 × Previous Experience × Target Tenure				−0.028	−0.064	−0.017
				(0.349)	(0.373)	(0.016)
DPC-FP=2 × Previous Experience × Target Tenure				0.877*	0.293	0.001
				(0.366)	(0.364)	(0.015)

Control variables are included in all models, but are subtracted from the table to save space

|						
Observations	3,696	3,413	3,407	3,696	3,413	3,407
Log Likelihood	-542.683	-489.867	-487.943	-542.972	-490.173	-488.220

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on directed-leader-dyads are in parentheses. Target state fixed effects are included in all models. [+]p<0.1; [*]p<0.05; [**]p<0.01; [***]p<0.001

Table B4: Robustness check with alternative measures of DPC

	(B17)	(B18)	CM1 (B19)	CM2 (B20)	CM3 (B21)	CM4 (B22)
Target Tenure	−0.095	−0.078	0.024	0.031	−0.001	0.010
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.089)
DPC						
DPC-General (continuous)	1.819					
	(1.255)					
DPC-FP (continous)		2.959$^+$				
		(1.773)				
DPC=1 (Significantly More Dovish)			0.246	0.422	−0.217	−0.067
			(1.139)	(1.166)	(0.883)	(0.890)
DPC=2 (Significantly More Hawkish)			1.895	2.887$^+$	1.136	1.560
			(1.658)	(1.567)	(2.025)	(1.944)
Interaction Terms						
DPC-General (continuous) × Target Tenure	−0.355$^+$					
	(0.185)					
DPC-FP (continuous) × Target Tenure		−0.467$^+$				
		(0.261)				
DPC=1 × Target Tenure			−0.030	−0.046	0.024	0.007
			(0.172)	(0.176)	(0.134)	(0.135)
DPC=2 × Target Tenure			−0.353	−0.494*	−0.240	−0.259
			(0.248)	(0.243)	(0.315)	(0.306)

Control variables are included in all models, but are subtracted from the table to save space

Observations	3,588	3,588	3,350	3,350	3,350	3,350
Log Likelihood	-538.969	-540.365	-477.239	-477.045	-478.276	-478.705

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on directed-leader-dyads are in parentheses. Target state fixed effects are included in all models.$^+$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure B1: Predicted Probability of being Challenged (Model B20)

Note: shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals generated through 1000 draws of new coefficients from the posterior.

Table B5: Robustness check with alternative measures of leaders' tenure

	Number of Years in Office		Number of Days in Office by the end of the observation period	
	(B23)	(B24)	(B25)	(B26)
Target Tenure	0.310$^+$	0.311$^+$	0.362**	0.364**
	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.122)	(0.122)
DPC				
DPC-General=1 (Right to Left)	0.457		0.290	
	(0.369)		(1.223)	
DPC-General=2 (Left to Right)	0.937**		3.293**	
	(0.350)		(1.068)	
DPC-FP=1 (Right to Left)		0.519		0.549
		(0.378)		(1.209)
DPC-FP=2 (Left to Right)		0.877*		3.282**
		(0.352)		(1.106)
Interaction Terms				
DPC-General=1 × Target Tenure	0.028		0.025	
	(0.260)		(0.177)	
DPC-General=2 × Target Tenure	−0.759**		−0.465**	
	(0.268)		(0.158)	
DPC-FP=1 × Target Tenure		−0.054		−0.015
		(0.265)		(0.174)
DPC-FP=2 × Target Tenure		−0.685*		−0.462**
		(0.272)		(0.165)
Controls				
Challenger Tenure	0.109	0.112	0.137$^+$	0.140$^+$
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Challenger Age	−0.013	−0.014	−0.015$^+$	−0.016$^+$
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Target Age	0.025$^+$	0.023$^+$	0.018	0.017
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Challenger Gender	−0.971	−0.924	−1.041$^+$	−1.013
	(0.630)	(0.634)	(0.626)	(0.629)
Target Gender	−0.798$^+$	−0.776$^+$	−0.727$^+$	−0.716$^+$
	(0.421)	(0.422)	(0.419)	(0.419)
Previous Experience	−0.071	−0.067	−0.011	−0.015
	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.236)	(0.237)
Pre-election MIDs (5-year)	0.023	0.024	0.024	0.024
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Relative Power	1.513**	1.513**	1.523**	1.527**
	(0.527)	(0.526)	(0.529)	(0.529)
Joint Democracy	0.161	0.162	0.159	0.167
	(0.347)	(0.350)	(0.348)	(0.348)
Bilateral Trade	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Distance	−0.286***	−0.287***	−0.283***	−0.285***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Cold War	−0.253	−0.236	−0.207	−0.177
	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.212)
Peace Year	−0.072	−0.071	−0.088$^+$	−0.086$^+$
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Peace Year^2	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Peace Year^3	−0.00003	−0.00003	−0.00004	−0.00004
	(0.00003)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)
Constant	−1.195	−1.157	−3.755*	−3.737*
	(1.294)	(1.302)	(1.500)	(1.503)
Observations	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696
Log Likelihood	-549.227	-550.492	-546.537	-547.071

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on directed-leader-dyads are in parentheses.
Target state fixed effects are included in all models.$^+$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix C: Examine Alternative Explanation

Table C1: OLS models with Target Hostility as the dependent variable

	DV: Target Hostility			
	(C1)	(C2)	(C3)	(C4)
Target Tenure			−0.006	−0.006
			(0.015)	(0.015)
DPC				
DPC-General=1 (Right to Left)	0.050		−0.110	
	(0.123)		(0.111)	
DPC-General=2 (Left to Right)	−0.036		−0.151	
	(0.135)		(0.115)	
DPC-FP=1 (Right to Left)		−0.017		−0.114
		(0.131)		(0.116)
DPC-FP=2 (Left to Right)		0.017		−0.147
		(0.134)		(0.115)
Interaction Terms				
DPC-General=1 × Target Tenure			−0.001	
			(0.026)	
DPC-General=2 × Target Tenure			−0.017	
			(0.025)	
DPC-FP=1 × Target Tenure				0.001
				(0.026)
DPC-FP=2 × Target Tenure				−0.020
				(0.025)
Controls				
Challenger Tenure			0.001	0.001
			(0.005)	(0.005)
Challenger Age	0.007	0.007	0.005	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Age	0.001	0.00005	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Challenger Gender	0.514	0.481	0.413	0.417
	(0.756)	(0.770)	(0.305)	(0.306)
Target Gender	0.159	0.176	0.340^{+}	0.332^{+}
	(0.395)	(0.394)	(0.175)	(0.176)
Previous Experience	0.160	0.162	0.248^{***}	0.251^{***}
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Pre-Turnover MIDs (5-year)	−0.012	−0.013	-0.029^{***}	-0.028^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Relative Power	-0.813^{**}	-0.817^{**}	-0.681^{***}	-0.671^{***}
	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Joint Democracy	0.212	0.205	0.093	0.096
	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Bilateral Trade	-0.042^{***}	-0.042^{***}	-0.047^{***}	-0.047^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Distance	0.199^{***}	0.198^{***}	0.146^{***}	0.145^{***}
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Cold War	1.011^{***}	1.006^{***}	1.058^{***}	1.069^{***}
	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Constant	-3.231^{**}	-3.139^{**}	-2.355^{***}	-2.345^{***}
	(1.107)	(1.128)	(0.500)	(0.501)
Observations	823	823	3,692	3,692
R^2	0.180	0.180	0.196	0.196

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on directed-leader-dyads are in parentheses.
Target state fixed effects are included in all models.$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001